SHINGHAL, J.—Plaintiff Madanlal, who is the appellant, instituted a suit in the court of Munsiff, Jaipur City (East), on May 20, 1959, for the recovery of the arrears of rent, as well as for the eviction of defendant Noor Mohamad, on the ground that he had committed a default in the payment of rent for the period August 5, 1958 to May 4, 1959, in respect of the suit shop, and also on the ground that the shop was required by the plaintiff for his personal bona fide use. The defendant admitted the tenancy but denied the alleged defaults in the payment of the rent, as also the plaintiffs plea that he required the shop for his personal bona fide use. He challenged the validity of the notice as well. The learned Munsiff held that the defendant was not a defaulter, but he decreed the suit on October 12, 1960, for his eviction on the ground that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving his personal necessity for the shop and had also proved that he had given a valid notice to the defendant. The defendant went up in appeal which came to be heard by the learned Senior Civil Judge of Jaipur City. He held that the plaintiff had given a notice to the defendant but that the notice was not in accordance with the provisions of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, because the tenancy commenced from April 6, 1956, while the notice did not expire with the end of the month of the tenancy. The learned Civil Judge therefore accepted the appeal of the defendant and set aside the decree which had been granted in favour of the plaintiff for the defendants eviction from the shop. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiff has come up in second appeal to this Court.

2. The controversy in this appeal centres round the question whether the instrument which was admittedly executed by the parties on April 5, 1956, in regard to the tenancy of the shop, is a lease-deed or whether it is a mere kabuliyat. Mr. Bhandari has argued that the instrument is essentially unilateral in nature because its main recitals are on behalf of defendant Noor Mohamad who had undertaken upon himself the compliance of the various terms mentioned in it, and that the statement in this instrument that the terms of the rent-note were acceptable to the landlord did not change it into a bilateral agreement so as to make it a lease within the meaning of sec. 105 of the Act. The learned counsel has further argued that the mere fact that the instrument is signed by Madanlal, the landlord, does not also detract from the fact that it is a mere kabuliyat and nothing more.

3. A perusal of the aforesaid instrument leaves, however, no room for doubt that both the landlord and the tenant were parties to it. This is apparent from the fact that the instrument clearly narrates that the terms mentioned in it were acceptable to the landlord. Then there is the further fact that the landlord has signed it along side with the signature of the tenant. It is futile therefore to argue that the instrument in question is a mere kabuliyat.

4. Now, a lease is undoubtedly a contract under the provisions of sec. 105 of the Act and it is necessary that both the lessor and the lessee must execute the lease-deed or there should be counter-parts executed by each one of them. This is in fact amply borne out by Choteylal vs. Mt. Durga Bai(l) and Tulsiram Rajaram Talwar vs. Govinda Ramji Patil(2) on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Bhandari himself. There can therefore be little doubt that the transfer in question falls within the definition of a lease contained in sec. 107 of the Act.

5. Mr. Bhandari has however further argued that this could not be so because the instrument in question has, in the present case, been executed mainly by the lessee and that the lessors role in respect of it having been confined to his acceptance of the terms on which the lessee undertook to take the shop on lease, the transaction would not really amount to a lease of immovable property within

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