Significant delay in raising an industrial dispute is fatal to the workman, justifying dismissal of claims under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Order :

1. By way of filing this writ petition, a challenge has been led to the impugned award dated 25.09.2024 passed by the Labour Court, Kota (hereinafter referred to as “the Labour Court”) in LCR Case No.95/2003.

2. By passing the impugned award, the Labour Court has rejected the statement of claim submitted by the petitioner- workman (hereinafter referred to as “workman”) against his termination order dated 16.09.1985. The Labour Court has rejected the statement of claim on the ground of delay as the dispute was raised by the workman after a delay of 15 years inasmuch as his services were terminated by the respondents vide order dated 16.09.1985 while the dispute was raised in the year 2003 and no justification was provided by the workman neither before the Conciliation Officer nor before the Labour Court.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to justify the delay on the ground that the Labour Court was supposed to decide the claim only on the basis of the material available on the record but ignoring the same, the Labour Court has rejected the claim of the petitioner on a technical count of delay and not on merits.

4. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on the record.

5. It is the settled proposition of law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of judgments that considerable delay in raising an industrial dispute is fatal to the workman and if there is a delay of more than 15 years, the Labour Court can refuse to entertain such belated claims.

6. It is true that prior to the amendment to Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’), there was no limitation for raising industrial dispute by the workman, but now limitation of three years has been prescribed. However, it does not mean that the dispute can be raised by the workman at any point of time. A dispute which is stale could not be a subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act of 1947.

7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of the Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and others reported in AIR 2000 SC 839 has held in Para 6 as under:-

“6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference In question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent.”

8. In the instant case also the date of termination is 16.09.1985 and the dispute was raised by the workman after a delay of 18 years in the year 2003 and no justified reason for this inordinate delay has been given by him and that is why the Labour Court has rightly rejected his claim on the ground of 18 years delay.

9. This Court finds no illegality in the order passed by the Labour Court, which requires any interference of this Court.

10. Accordin