Significant delay in raising an industrial dispute is fatal to the workman's claim, and stale disputes cannot be referred under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Order :

1. By way of filing of this petition, a challenge has been led to the impugned award dated 05.06.2013, by which the statement of claim submitted by the petitioner-workman (hereinafter referred as 'workman') has been rejected. Thereafter, an application was submitted by the workman for recall of the aforesaid order, however, the said application was also rejected vide order dated 24.04.2014.

2. The contents of the petition indicates that the services of the workman were terminated by the respondents on 30.05.1983 and the workman raised an industrial dispute after a delay of more than 20 years i.e. in the year 2005 and thereafter, he did not produce any evidence in support of his claim in-spite of seeking several opportunities, hence, under these circumstances, the Labour Court had no option except to reject the claim submitted by the petitioner for want of evidence and for delay in raising the dispute.

3. The aforesaid order was passed by the Labour Court on 05.06.2013, thereafter, the petitioner was sitting over the matter for a considerable period. After some delay, an application was submitted for recall of the aforesaid order, however, the said application was also rejected vide order dated 24.04.2014, thereafter, again the petitioner remained inactive for a significant period. Later, approached this Court by way of filing this petition.

4. This fact is not in dispute that the services of the workman were terminated way back in May, 1983. This fact is also not in dispute that no dispute was raised by the petitioner for more than two decades, as he was sleeping over his rights. It is the settled proposition of law that delay in raising industrial dispute is fatal to the workman's case.

5. It is true that prior to amendment of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act of 1947'), there was no limitation on raising industrial dispute by the workman as no limitation period of three years was prescribed earlier, but that does not mean that the dispute can be raised by the workman at any point of time. A dispute which is stale could not be a subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act of 1947, as the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. KP Madhavankutty and Others reported in AIR 2000 SC 839 has held in para 6 as under:

“6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject- matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference In question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent.”

6. In the instant case also the date of termination of the workman is 30.05.1983, and the dispute was raised by the workman after delay of more than two decades and thereafter, the petitioner failed to adduce his evidence for a considerable time i.e. approximately eight years