The main legal principle established in the judgment is the need for strict enforcement of municipal laws to prevent unauthorized constructions and encroachments on public property, ensuring planned development and protecting public welfare and the environment.

JUDGMENT :

Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.

Affidavit on behalf of respondent No.3 filed in the open Court, made part of the file. It appears that there are number of cases of unauthorised constructions/encroachment pending in various courts/authorities including this Court.

2. It is more than settled that the public property cannot be allowed to be encroached and the concerned authorities have to ensure constant vigilance on encroachment. No right can be claimed to encroach upon the public property. A Division Bench of this Court in case titled 'Court on its own motion vs. State of H.P. and others, (2015) 3 ILR(HP) 569 : 2015 (4) RCR (Civ) 111, while dealing with the issue of encroachment by the hawkers and others in Shimla, observed as under:

"14. It is well settled that the hawkers have no fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India to carry on business at the place of their choice and convenience. The rights of hawkers, kiosk- users and vendors can never be absolute, but have to be limited and subservient to over all public interest.

15. In the Municipal Board, Manglaur Vs. Mahadeoji Maharaj, (1965) AIR SC 1147, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the roads and its sidewalks are laid for passage only and for no other purpose.

16. In Bombay Hawkers Union and others Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, (1985) AIR SC 1206, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:

"8 No one has any right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance, annoyance or inconvenience to the other members of the public. Public streets, by their very nomenclature and definition, are meant for the use of the general public. They are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private trade or business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them, they could hold the society to ransom by squatting on the center of busy thoroughfares, thereby paralyzing all civic like. Indeed, that is what some of them have done in some parts of the city. They have made it impossible for the pedestrians to walk on footpaths or even on the streets properly so-called."

17. In the case of Olga Tellis and others Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, (1986) AIR SC 180, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a municipality is empowered to cause to be removed encroachments on footpaths or pavements over which the public have a right of passage or access. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that:-

"43 In the first place, footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets .."

18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the misplaced arguments resting on life and liberty by those who were claiming occupation of the public streets. In this regard, it was observed that:

"43. There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up construction on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing and repassing, are competing claims and that the former should be preferred to the latter ..."

19. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) AIR SC 38, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the law that to remove an encroachment to the public road is the obligation of the municipality and that an injunction could not be granted to suffer an encroachment of a public place like a street which is meant for the use of the pedestrians. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the plea of life and liberty raised in the context of carrying on trade or business on a public road. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that there can be no fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place where he