Point of Law: Section 173 provides that, any person aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach the High Court within ninety days. However, the second proviso states that the High Court “may” still entertain such appeal even after the expiry of ninety days, if the appellant satisfies the Court that there exists sufficient reason behind the delay.

ORDER :

By way of instant application, a prayer has been made to condone the delay of 1019 days in filing the appeal under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against award dated 01.09.2017, passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehr, District Shimla, H.P. in M.A.C. Petition No. 73-R/2 of 2016/2015.

2. Applicant contends that she had met the counsel representing her in the instant application in January, 2021 and was advised that the award passed by learned Tribunal was on lower side and she could take the chance of enhancement in compensation by preferring the appeal before this Court.

3. As per averments made in the application, the applicant had filed execution petition after passing of the award and had received the awarded amount in August, 2020. It is also submitted that applicant was under mental depression on account of death of her young son.

4. As per applicant, the delay in filing the appeal was not intentional. She, otherwise, was not aware about the period of limitation prescribed to file the appeal. It is further contended that applicant would have achieved nothing by delaying the filing of the appeal.

5. The prayer of the applicant is contested on behalf of respondent No.3, on the ground that the application is abuse of process of law as no cogent and satisfactory reason has been assigned for condonation of huge delay of 1019 days.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.

7. The plea that applicant was under depression as she had lost her son, has remained unsubstantiated. Except for the bald assertions made in the application, nothing has been placed on record to prove the same. The reason, so assigned, otherwise, also does not appear to be convincing as there is nothing to infer as to when applicant had lost her son. If the reference is to the death of son of the applicant, for whom, she has been compensated through award sought to be impugned, the same dates back to the year 2015. Applicant had filed the petition herself under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. She had contested the same and thereafter received the awarded amount after preferring execution. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the applicant suffered from the depression, as claimed.

8. Another fact that cannot be ignored is that applicant was throughout represented by a counsel right from the date of filing of petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act till the culmination of execution proceedings in August, 2020. Even after the passing of award, applicant had contacted her counsel for filing execution. The counsel, who had contested the claim of the applicant had not advised her to file appeal for enhancement of compensation.

9. As per the case of applicant, she decided to prefer the appeal as well as instant application only when she was advised by another counsel to take a chance by preferring the appeal. Thus, applicant has filed the appeal accompanied by present application on the advise of a counsel, who had not represented her before the learned Tribunal.

10. Mr. J.L. Bhardwaj, Advocate, learned counsel for the applicant has contended with vehemence that the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation and the Court should take lenient and pragmatic view while deciding the present application. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. MST. Katiji and Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107, in which it was observed as under:-

“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the ins