IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT SRINAGAR
Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J.
Mohd. Hashim Qureshi - Appellant
Versus
State Of J&K & Ors. - Respondent
561-A Cr.P.C. No. 3/2003
Decided On : 29 March, 2007
561-A - Quashing of Order - 1989( 1933 A. D), 2005 (1948 A.D) - Section 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 14 - The court discussed the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code, the bar created by the Ordinance, and the limitations on exercising inherent jurisdiction in the presence of a specific bar in any other enactment. The court referred to relevant case law and concluded that the Ordinance created a bar on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, thus dismissing the petition.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner filed a petition under section 561-A Cr. P. C. 1989( 1933 A. D) for quashing of an order passed by the Special Judge, Srinagar, under sections 365,392,435 and 120-B RFC and Section 3 of the Enemy Agents Ordinance Act, 2005 (1948 A.D). The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petition is not maintainable in view of the bar contained in the Ordinance.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the Ordinance created a bar on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, thus dismissing the petition.
Issues: The crucial question was whether the court is competent to exercise inherent jurisdiction in the given circumstances of the case.
Ratio Decidendi: The court discussed the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code, the bar created by the Ordinance, and the limitations on exercising inherent jurisdiction in the presence of a specific bar in any other enactment.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition, upholding the preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding the maintainability of the petition.
2. Mr. Rathore, AAG, learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petition is not maintainable in view of the bar contained in the Ordinance. He further argued that the Ordinance provides how to conduct trial and before whom orders passed by the Special Judge can be questioned. In support of his submissions, he referred to the provisions of section 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 14 of the Ordinance.
3. While rebutting the arguments of Mr. Rathore, Mr. Jan argued that this court is having inherent powers and is within its jurisdiction to quash the proceedings in accordance with law.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the matter.
5. The crucial question which requires adjudication is whether this court is competent to exercise inherent jurisdiction in terms of Section 561-A of the Code in the given circumstances of the case?
6. In order to return a finding on this question, it profitable to notice section 561-A of the Code:
"561-A. Saving of Inherent power of High Court.--Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
7. This provision specifically mandates that the High Court is within its powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give affect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is no-where provided in this provision of law that bar created by any statute or enactment will not limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court.
8. The Apex Court in case titled Satya Narayan Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 8 SCC 607, held that if any statute or enactment creates a bar for exercise of any jurisdiction, the inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to get over that bar. It is profitable to reproduce para 15 of the said judgment here under:--
"There is another reason also why the submission that Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act would not apply to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, cannot be accepted. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words "Nothing in his Code". Thus the inherent power can be exercised even if there was a contrary provision in the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide that inherent jurisdiction can be exercised notwithstanding any other provision contained in any other enactment. Thus if an enactment contains a specific bar, then inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to get over that bar. As has been pointed out in the cases of Madhu Limaya Vs. State of Maharashtra, Janata Dal vs. H. S. Chowdhary and Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, the inherent jurisdiction cannot be resorted to if there was a specific provision or there is an express bar of law. "
Same view was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in case titled Durga Prasad, Chandra Chits Vs. Karri Sivannarayana, 2005 Cri. L. J. 2637 It was held that inherent powers should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was further held that this power cannot be exercised against an express bar in some other enactrnent. The Apex Court in yet another case titled State through Special Cell, New Delhi Vs. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641, has also taken the same view.
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