The sufficiency of the cause for condoning the delay must ultimately be decided by the Court, on the facts of each case, and an appeal along with an application for delay in filing that appeal, when dismissed on refusal to condone the delay, is a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Judgment

Vinod Chatterji Koul, J.—Mir Asif Fayaz son of Fayaz Ahmad Mir resident of Avengund Tehsil and District Pulwama – respondent no.1 herein, had filed a Suit for Declaration and Mandatory Injunction before the court of Sub Judge (Special Mobile Magistrate) Pulwama (for short “Trial Court”), to declare decision, taken on his representation by J&K Board of School Education/defendants - petitioners herein, issued vide communication no.1602(Certs-Cers-1) B/2010 dated 13.12.2010, as inoperative, ineffective and null and void and also direct petitioner-Board, to carry necessary correction in the relevant records, showing plaintiff/ respondent no.1, as son of Fayaz Ahamd Mir instead of Ali Muhammad Mir. By judgement and decree dated 2nd July 2015, allowing suit of respondent no.1, the Trial Court directed petitioner-Board to carry necessary correction in the records showing father’s name of plaintiff/respondent no.1 as Fayaz Ahmad Mir instead of Ali Muhammad Mir and in this regard issue necessary certificate.

2. Petitioner Board preferred an Appeal against Trial Court judgement and decree before the court of Principal District Judge, Pulwama (hereinafter referred to as “Appellate Court”). However, since there was delay in preferring Appeal against Trial Court judgement and decree, an application for condoning delay was also filed by petitioners before Appellate Court. The said application, vide judgement dated 2nd July 2015, has been dismissed by Appellate Court. It is how petitioners have come up before this Court with Civil Revision on hand under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking setting-aside of judgement of Appellate Court.

3. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner has stated that Appellate Court did not appreciate explanation tendered by petitioners in preferring Appeal beyond the period of limitation. Copy of judgement and decree is stated to have been received by petitioners on 29th August 2015, which was conveyed to counsel so as to file an Appeal, who for reason of frequent strikes, particularly in the month of August and October, filed Appeal late by a month, which period, as maintained by learned counsel for petitioners, is a small interval and does not require any stringent application. Learned counsel for petitioner, in support of his submissions, has placed on Reliable Water Supply Service of India v. Union of India, (1972) 4 SCC 168; Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and another v. Mst Khatiji and others, AIR 1987 SCC 1353; Pepsi Foods Limited v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, 1998 (5) SCC 749; Riyaz Ahmad Bhat v. Abdul Majid Bhat, 2004 (1) JKJ 608 HC; Kishori Lal and others v. Chaman Lal and others, 2007 (1) SLJ 268; Ajay Bansal v. Anup Mehta and others, AIR 2007 SC 909; Col. Anil Kak (Retd.) v. Municipal Corporation Indore and others, AIR 2007 SC 1130; and Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan and others v. Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur and others, 2009 (5) SCC 162.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no.1 vehemently insists that petitioner-Board has miserably failed before Appellate Court to demonstrate sufficient cause for delay in preferring Appeal, inasmuch as application for condonation of delay was totally incorrect vague, false and baseless. According to him petitioner-Board being most highest and responsible hierarchy of public servants, deliberately and intentionally gave a false affidavit by submitting that they were having no knowledge of judgement and decree notwithstanding the fact that they participated in proceedings before Trial Court, submitted its written statement, cross-examined witnesses, submitted Arguments through their counsel, and heard judgement when learned Trial Court pronounced the same in open Court in presence of counsels for parties. Thus, the time against petitioner-Board started from the date of judgement/decree i.e. 2nd July 2015 and that petitioner-Board suppressed the date when it applied for