Point of Law: One act may not be sufficient to form the requisite satisfaction, there is no such invariable rule and that in a given case one act may suffice.

JUDGMENT :

TASHI RABSTAN, J.

1. District Magistrate, Pulwama-respondent No. 2 (for brevity “detaining authority”) has by Order No. 43/DMP/PSA/20 dated 26.11.2020 placed Mohammad Yousuf Magray S/o Abdul Gani Magray R/o Lassipora Tehsil Litter District Pulwama (for short “detenue”) under preventive detention, with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State. It is this order, petitioner has challenged in this petition and seeks quashment thereof on grounds averred therein.

2. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents in opposition to the petition. Detention record has also been produced by counsel for the respondents to substantiate the statements made in counter affidavit.

3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the matter.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, to augment the case set up by the petitioner in the petition on hand contended that the detenue was arrested on 19.04.2020 in FIR No. 41/2020 under Sections 13, 18, 39 ULA(P) Act of Police Station Litter and subsequently, was released on bail by the Court of Special Judge TADA/POTA Srinagar on 19.11.2020, however, after four days the he was again arrested in terms of the impugned detention order. It is averred that the detenue at the time of passing of detention order was already under police custody. It is further averred that the grounds of detention are vague, equivocal, obscure, indefinite, ambiguous and not connected with the detenue and are mere assertions of the detaining authority. Further averred that the respondents have not supplied the documents, i.e. order of detention, dossier, copy of FIRs, recovery memo, statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and other documents relied upon by the detaining authority while passing the impugned detention order, so as to enable the detenue to make an effective representation.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents insists that detention order has been passed on subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority and detention order is in accordance with law and there is no violation or infringement of rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Hence, he exhorts dismissal of petition.

6. Given the case set up and submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it is apt to mention that whether a person, who is in jail, can be detained under preventive detention law, has been a subject matter of consideration before the Supreme Court very often. In Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat and Another vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1196, the Supreme Court, while considering the same issue has reconsidered its earlier judgments on the point in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1964 SC 334, Masood Alam vs. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 897, Dulal Roy vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1975 SC 1508, Alijan Mian vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, AIR 1983 SC 1130, Ramesh Yadav vs. District Magistrate, Etah, AIR 1986 SC 315, Suraj Pal Sahu vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1986 SC 2177, Binod Singh vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, AIR 1986 SC 2090, Smt. Shashi Aggarwal vs. State of U.P. AIR 1988 SC 596 and came to the conclusion that an order for detention can be passed against a person in custody and for that purpose, it is necessary that grounds of detention must show that (i) detaining authority was aware of the fact that detenue is already in detention and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that detenue is already in detention. The expression “compelling reasons” in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before detaining authority on the basis whereof it may be satisfied that (a) detenue is likely to be released from custody in near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of antecedent activities of detenue, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it i