The discretion to grant interim compensation under Section 143-A of the NI Act must be supported by reasons and should be based on well-recognized principles.

JUDGMENT

Sanjay Dhar, J. - The petitioner has challenged order dated 30.12.2019 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class (Munsiff), Bandipora, whereby in an application for grant of interim compensation under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as the NI Act), the learned Magistrate has granted interim compensation @20% of the cheque amount i.e., an amount of Rs.13.60 lacs in favour of the respondent(hereinafter referred to as the complainant) against the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as accused).

2. A perusal of the record shows that the complainant has filed a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act against the accused before the trial court. In the complaint it has been alleged that the accused has issued a cheque bearing No.787621 dated 02.08.2018 for an amount of Rs.68.00 lacs in favour of the complainant to discharge his liability which, according to the complainant, was to the tune of Rs.1,43,10,324/. The cheque was drawn on Jammu and Kashmir Bank Limited Branch, Handwara. The complainant when presented the cheque for encashment, the same was returned by the bank of the accused unpaid on the ground of insufficiency of funds regarding which memo dated 30.10.2018 was issued by the bank. It is further averred in the complaint that a legal notice of demand was issued by the complainant through his counsel that was served upon the accused on 28.11.2018. When the accused failed to liquidate his liability within the statutory period after the service of demand notice, the complaint came to be filed by the complainant before the trial Magistrate.

3. It appears that during the pendency of the complaint, the complainant filed an application under Section 143-A of the NI Act before the trial Magistrate on 27.04.2019. Prior to that, on 25.03.2019, the plea of the accused was recorded by the trial Magistrate and in his statement, he has denied having issued the cheque in question in favour of the complainant. The learned trial Magistrate, after hearing the parties, passed the impugned order dated 30.12.2019, whereby the petitioner has been directed to pay an interim compensation @20% of the cheque amount i.e., Rs.13.60 lacs to the complainant. It is this order which is under challenge before this Court by way of instant petition.

3) Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case.

4. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order passed by the learned trial Magistrate is devoid of any reasons, inasmuch as in the impugned order the learned Magistrate has not spelled out as to why an amount @20% of the cheque amount has been awarded as interim compensation in favour of the complainant, particularly when the accused had denied the issuance of cheque in favour of the respondent/ complainant.

5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the provisions contained in Section 143-A of the NI Act are mandatory in nature and, as such, the learned trial Magistrate was bound to pass an order of interim compensation in favour of the complainant. It has been further contended that the impugned order is revisable in nature and, as such, the instant petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C is not maintainable. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgments of the High Court of Chhattisgarh in the case of Rajesh Soni vs. Mukesh Verma (CRMP No.562 of 2021 dated 30.06.2021) and the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of R. P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 862).

6. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the instant petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C is not maintainable in view of availability of remedy of revision against the impugned order is concerned, the same does not carry much force for the reason that this Court is also vested with the revisional jurisdiction in respect of the orders passed by inferior criminal courts. E