JUDGMENT :

Javed Iqbal Wani, J.

1. The instant appeal has been filed by the appellant herein, against order dated 15.02.2023, under an in terms of Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, (for short 'the Act') for setting aside of order dated 15.02.2023 (for short 'the impugned order') passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Jammu (for short 'the Court below') in case titled as Kulbir Singh v. Mahant Subah Shah .

2. Upon coming up this appeal for consideration, the counsel for the appellant came to be directed to address on the question of maintainability of the appeal in the first instance.

3. Mr. U.K. Jalali, Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant, in response to the question of maintainability of the instant appeal would contend that though the order under challenge in the instant appeal is not provided to be an appealable order under section 37 of the Act of 1996, yet the same can be treated and converted either into a revision petition or else a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The counsel for the appellant in support of his submissions relied upon to the judgments of the Apex Court passed in case titled as (Col.) Anil Kak (Retd.) v. Municipal Corporation, Indore , (2005) 12 SCC 734 and in case titled as Kiran Devi v. The Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board & Ors. AIR 2021 SC 195. Besides the aforesaid judgments, the judgment passed by this Court in case titled as President D.A.V. College Managing Committee v. Poonam Mahajan & Ors. 2018 (3) Jammu Kashmir Law Times 646 also came to be relied upon by the counsel.

4. Before proceeding to deal with the submissions made by Mr. Jalali, a brief background of the case hereunder becomes imperative.

5. The parties herein for resolving their disputes with respect to various properties, appointed respondent 2 herein as Sole Arbitrator on the basis of an Arbitration Clause contained in an agreement having been entered into between the parties. The nominated Arbitrator passed an Award on 10.02.2013. Aggrieved of the said Award, the respondent-1 herein filed an application under section 34 of the Act accompanied with an application for condonation of delay before the court below.

6. The Court below upon considering the aforesaid application for condonation of delay and taking into consideration response thereto from the non-applicant appellant herein, condoned the delay in terms of the impugned order allowing the application for condonation of delay.

7. Having regard to the nature of issue being dealt with by this Court, a reference to Section 37 and Section 5 of the Act becomes necessary:

“S.37. Appealable orders:

(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order namely:

(a) Granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 6.

(b) Setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 .

(2) An appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal:

(a) Accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 16.

(b) Granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17.

(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.”

What emanates from a plain reading of Section 37 of the Act is that the legislature by using expression an appeal shall lie from the orders provided therein 'and from no others' has taken away the right to appeal against all orders except specified in Section 37 (1) and (2) and the words 'and from no others' although not present