JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Mr. Mritunjay Choudhary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Suraj Verma, the learned State counsel and Mr. Venkatesh Gopal, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.2.

2. This petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard.

3. This petition has been filed for quashing of the order dated 07.01.2020 arising out of Complaint Case No.201/2019 whereby cognizance has been taken under sections 498A/323/406/504 read with section 34 of the I.P.C as well as section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and to quash the entire criminal proceeding, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhanbad.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that on the basis of mutual settlement, an application was moved before the competent court under section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act which was numbered as Original Suit No.484/2020 which has been decreed on 24.07.2021 by which the decree of divorce has been passed. The one-time alumini has already been allowed in favour of the O.P.No.2.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the O.P.No.2 accepts the submission of Mr. Mritunjay Choudhary, the learned counsel for the petitioners.

6. Both the counsels submit that a joint-compromise petition being I.A. No.3695/2021 has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding, which has been supported by the affidavit of both the petitioner no.1 and petitioner no.3 of the original suit and the said joint petition has also been supported by the affidavit by the O.P.No.2 namely, Anuja Kumari.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioners and the O.P.No.2 jointly submit that except section 498A of the IPC and sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, all other sections are compoundable.

8. The learned counsels appearing for the parties submit that the joint compromise has been taken place between the parties and this matter can be allowed in terms of judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “B.S.Joshi v. State of Haryana” reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 as well as in the case of “Gain Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr.” reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303.

9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of ”B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr.” reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 at Paragraph nos.8, 10, 11, 12 and 15 of the said judgment has held as under:

“8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

10. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This Court said that the compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper real