IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY, J.
Suhas Godbole son of Late D.Y. Godbole – Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand - Respondent
Cr. Rev. No. 953 of 2013
Decided on : 23-08-2021
Criminal Procedural Code, 1973 - Section 315 - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138, 139, 118, 142(b) - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 114 – Dishonor of cheque due to insufficient funds - Petitioner has submitted that in judgments passed by both courts below no finding has been recorded with regards to service of statutory notice regarding bouncing of cheque upon petitioner, although finding has been recorded with regards to dispatch of legal notice through registered cover - She submits that petitioner had denied service of notice regarding bouncing of cheque - Whether appellate court was justified in setting aside trial court’s judgment of acquittal of petitioner - Whether appellant had proved charge against the accused beyond all shadow of reasonable doubt - Whether judgment passed by trial court needed any interference - Whether judgment passed by trial court needed any interference – Held, defence taken by petitioner on basis of Exhibit-A that entire cheque amount was returned by petitioner to complainant was certainly a probable defence when seen in light of principles of “preponderance of probabilities” and appellate court erred in law in rejecting the defence of petitioner and not considering case on principles of “preponderance of probabilities” - Court is of considered view that materials on record suggest that accused-petitioner had discharged his burden and rebutted statutory presumption under Section 139 of aforesaid Act of 1881 on principles of “preponderance of probabilities “and the complainant failed to further shift burden to accused petitioner - This Court finds that accused has been able to displace presumption under Section 139 of aforesaid Act of 1881 and established a probable defence whereby, onus again shifted to complainant and complainant failed to discharge same - Accordingly, point no. (b) is also decided in favour of accused petitioner and consequently, conviction of petitioner for offence under Section 138 of aforesaid Act of 1881 passed by appellate court cannot be sustained in eyes of law - Petition allowed.
JUDGMENT :
1. Heard Ms. Pooja Kumari, learned amicus appearing on behalf of the petitioner.
2. Heard Mr. Shailesh Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party-State.
3. Heard Mr. Manish Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.2.
4. This criminal revision application has been filed against the judgment dated 03.09.2013 passed in Criminal Appeal No.87 of 2013 by learned court of Principal Sessions Judge, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur whereby the appellate court has been pleased to set aside the judgment of acquittal of the petitioner dated 23.01.2013 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur in Complaint C/1 Case No.3444 of 2010 and convicted the petitioner for offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1881) and directed the learned trial court to pass an order of sentence after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the sides.
5. The matter was taken up by this Court on 26.11.2020 and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.2 had submitted that pursuant to the appellate order, the petitioner did not appear before the learned trial court and therefore the matter is still pending for passing an order of sentence against the petitioner.
Arguments on behalf of the Petitioner
6. Learned Amicus appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that in the judgments passed by both the courts below no finding has been recorded with regards to service of statutory notice regarding bouncing of cheque upon the petitioner, although finding has been recorded with regards to dispatch of legal notice through registered cover. She submits that the petitioner had denied service of notice regarding bouncing of the cheque. She submits that it was for the prosecution to prove service of statutory notice which is a condition precedent for filing a case under section 138 of the aforesaid Act of 1881 and even if deemed service of notice sent under registered cover is taken into consideration, the complaint itself was pre-mature as it was filed prior to expiry of the statutory time line.
The other point involved in the present case is whether the learned appellate court was justified in setting aside the trial court’s judgment of acquittal of the petitioner. She submits that the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was certainly one of the possible views; there was no illegality or perversity in the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court calling for interference by the learned appellate court; the appellate court did not record any perversity in the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court. She submits that the manner in which the learned appellate court has exercised the appellate jurisdiction in the matter of setting aside the judgment of acquittal by the learned trial court calls for interference in revisional jurisdiction of this Court in order to meet the ends of justice.
Arguments on behalf of the opposite parties
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties have submitted that the impugned judgment of setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court is legal and valid in view of the fact that the learned trial court did not appreciate the legal presumption under section 139 of the aforesaid Act of 1881 in connection with the issuance and bouncing of cheque. He submits that the learned appellate court after considering the evidences on record found that the defence failed to establish the genuineness of Exhibit A through which it was claimed that the entire amount has been refunded to the complainant and was of the view that all the requirements to establish a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act were fully satisfied by the complainant. The learned counsel for the opposite party has also relied upon a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in Cr. Appeal No.271 of 2020 with analogo
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Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat
Negotiable instrument - Notice - Cause of action for filing a complaint case under Section 138 of the N.I. Act could not arise prior to expiry of 15 days from the date of service of legal notice on t....
The cause of action for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot arise before expiry of 15 days from the date of service of notice upon the accused.
The court emphasized the importance of valid service of legal notice and the necessity for the complaint to be filed after the expiry of 15 days from the date of service of notice, as prescribed unde....
The burden of proof on the complainant, the presumption in favor of the complainant under sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act, and the accused's obligation to rebut such presumption are crucial lega....
The presumption of liability under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is rebuttable, and the accused must provide evidence to counter it; failure to do so results in conviction.
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