The interpretation of the applicability of the Factory Act and the sections of IPC to the accident that occurred in a factory premises was the central legal point established in the judgment.

JUDGMENT :

1. In this petition the prayer has been made for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings including the order taking cognizance dated 18.01.2012 in connection with Chandil P.S. Case No.69 of 2008, G.R.No.274 of 2008 lodged under sections 285, 287 and 304(A) of the IPC pending in the court of learned SDJM, Saraikela.

2. The FIR was registered alleging therein that on 22.4.2008 around 12.00 p.m., the informant along with other labourers were working in the premises of the company i.e. Narsingh Ispat Private Limited. The diesel tanker which is established inside the premises of the company blasted due to unknown reason and due to which fire broke out in and around the tanker area, owing to which a labour who was working in the premises caught onto fire and was burnt whose name was Anadi Mahto. Since he was injured the others labour who were in the premises took him to MGM Hospital, where he was admitted and further treatment was provided to him, but he died during treatment at and around 2.00 p.m.

3. Mr. Nitin Pasari, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that charge sheet was submitted on 30.12.2011 under section 285, 287 and 304 (A) of the IPC on 18.01.2012. He further submits that the accident took place in the factory and for that the Factory Inspector has already lodged the complaint case before the competent court which is the subject matter in Cr.M.P.No.206 of 2013. He further submits that Factory Act is a complete Code in itself and the punishment is prescribed therein and for the same occurrence the FIR has been lodged against the petitioners which is against the mandate of law. He further submits that it is well settled that if a special legislation is there, the sections of IPC are not attracted. He further submits that the case has been compromised with the family of the deceased and he refers to Annexure-3 and submits that a sum of Rs.6 lacs was paid to the family of the deceased and two employment has also been provided to the family of the deceased. He relied in the case of Rabindra Agarwal v. The State of Jharkhand and Another, 2010(2) JLJR 36. Paragraph no. 8 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder:

“I do find sufficient force in the submission. There has been no doubt that the allegation upon which FIR was lodged comes well within the ambit of the provision as enshrined under section 92 of the Factories Act and as such prosecution under the general law in view of section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not permissible and this proposition of law has already been laid down in the case of Binod Kumar Das and Another v. State of Jharkhand and Another.”

4. On these grounds, he submits that this proceeding is an abuse of process of law.

5. Mr. Azeemuddin, the learned counsel for the respondent State submits that there is no illegality in the order taking cognizance and the learned court has rightly taken cognizance looking into the charge sheet.

6. Mr. Alok Lal, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.2 submits that the accident took place and in that view of the matter the FIR was lodged and the charge sheet has been submitted and pursuant thereto cognizance has been taken which is in accordance with law and there is no illegality.

7. In view of the above submission of the learned counsel for the parties the Court has gone through the materials on record including the order taking cognizance and finds that the order taking cognizance is bad in law as the blank spaces have been filled up by way of writing the sections and the name of the petitioners which prima facie suggest that there is non-application of judicial mind. Further reference may be made to Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Government (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 2 SCC 18. Paragraph nos.31, 32 and 37 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

“31. Having noted the provisions, it has to be recapitulated that Section 67 clearly stipulates punishment for publishing, transmitting obscene materials in electronic fo