The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provisions of the CGST Act prevail over the provisions of the Limitation Act, and there is no power to entertain an appeal beyond the prescribed period or to condone delay beyond the permissible period provided under the CGST Act.

JUDGMENT :

1. Per Arup Kumar Goswami, Chief Justice Heard Mr. Prateek Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents.

2. This appeal is presented against an order dated 27.10.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (T) No.97 of 2020, dismissing the writ petition.

3. The appellant is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and engaged in the business of manufacturing iron and steel products. The appellant had filed TRAN-1 to claim CGST input credit of Rs.30,74,436/-. However, the Adjudicating Authority by an order dated 26.06.2019 had disallowed the CGST input credit of Rs.25,33,950/-.

4. Against the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred an appeal on 16.12.2019 under Section 107 (1) of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 (for short, ‘CGST Act’) before respondent No.3 and had deposited 10% of the amount in dispute.

5. The appeal was rejected by an order dated 20.12.2019 passed by respondent No.3 on the ground of the same being barred by limitation.

6. Writ petition was filed assailing the said order dated 20.12.2019 passed by respondent No.3 with a further prayer to direct the respondent No.3 to hear the appeal preferred by the appellant on merits.

7. It will be appropriate to extract relevant provisions of Section 107 of the CGST Act :

“107. Appeals to Appellate Authority.-(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person.

(2) The Commissioner may, on his own motion, or upon request from the Commissioner of State tax or the Commissioner of Union territory tax, call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an adjudicating authority has passed any decision or order under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the said decision or order and may, by order, direct any officer subordinate to him to apply to the Appellate Authority within six months from the date of communication of the said decision or order for the determination of such points arising out of the said decision or order as may be specified by the Commissioner in his order.

(3) Where, in pursuance of an order under subsection (2), the authorised officer makes an application to the Appellate Authority, such application shall be dealt with by the Appellate Authority as if it were an appeal made against the decision or order of the adjudicating authority and such authorised officer were an appellant and the provisions of this Act relating to appeals shall apply to such application.

(4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month.

x x x

x x x ”

8. The learned Single Judge held that in terms of Sections 107 (1) and 107 (4) of the CGST Act, the Appellate Authority has no power to entertain an appeal beyond the period of one month as stipulated in Section 107 (4) and the Appellate Authority becomes functus officio. It is also held that there is no power to entertain the application for condonation of delay beyond the permissible period provided under the CGST Act.

9. Mr. Prateek Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant submits that delay that had occasioned was on account of the fact that the Chartered Accountant, who was authorised by the appellant to prefer an appeal, had suffered serious ailment, and therefore, an application for condonation of