Judicial Review of Administrative orders.

The Honourable Chief Justice:

This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned order of the learned single Judge dated 26.2.2004.

2. We heard the learned Special Government Pleader for the appellants and find no merit in this appeal.

3. The learned single Judge in her order has quashed the order dated 4.3.1996 on the ground that it was passed mechanically without proper application of mind by merely filling up a cyclostyled form which stated that the objections of the land owner to the acquisition are overruled.

4. We agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge.

5. Under Section 4(2) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act 1978 (Act XXXI of 1978) (hereinafter referred to as the `Act'), the District Collector can authorise any officer to give a hearing to the land owner and under Section 4(3)(b) of the Act, such officer, after hearing the party concerned, has to make a report to the District Collector containing his recommendations on the cause shown by the land owner and on such report, the District Collector may pass such orders as he may deem fit. Section 4(3)(b) of the Act states as follows:

" Where any officer authorised by the District Collector has called upon the owner or other person to show cause under sub-section (2), the officer so authorised shall make a report to the District Collector containing his recommendations on the cause so shown for the decision of the District Collector. After considering such report the District Collector may pass such orders as he may deem fit."

Even assuming that the order of the District Collector under Section 4(3)(b) of the Act is an administrative order and not a quasi judicial order, it is now well settled that even administrative orders are subject to judicial review on the Wednesbury principle, vide Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. Vs. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All E.R. 680.

5. Before the decision of the House of Lords in the Wednesbury case in 1947 (supra), the broad distinction was that administrative orders were not subject to judicial review but quasi judicial orders were subject to such review. However, by the decision of the House of Lords in the Wednesbury case (supra) in 1947, this legal position changed and thereafter the view taken by the Courts in England as well as in India is that even administrative orders are subject to judicial review though on narrower grounds than judicial or quasi judicial orders, vide A.K.Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150.

6. In the Wednesbury Case (supra) the House of Lords observed:

“A person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly, be said, and often is said, to be acting “unreasonably”.

7. Thus, it is not correct to say that administrative orders are not subject to judicial review at all. According to the Wednesbury principle, if an administrative order is passed without proper application of mind by the administrative authority to the relevant factors to which the said authority should have applied his mind, then the said order is liable to be quashed, vide Rohtas Industries Ltd. Vs. S.D.Agarwal, AIR 1969 S.C. 707 (vide para-33).

8. In the present case, it appears that the order of the District Collector was passed in a mechanical manner without proper application of mind by merely filling up a cyclostyled form. We cannot approve of such kind of orders. It may be that the Special Tahsildar, who was authorised by the District Collector, considered the objections of the land owners, but in our opinion the District Collector must also consider those objections and apply his own mind to those objections, as has been held in the Wednesbury case (see quotation above). Though we agree with the learned Special Governmen