M. ANANTANARAYANAN, C. J. :- The issue that has been referred to this Full Bench can be very simply stated : It is, whether an order granting leave to sue in forma pauperis by a single Judge of the High Court, is a judgement within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent ? Even in this restricted form, the issue involves a conflict of the case law in this Court. In M.R. Ananthanarayana Iyer v. Rarichan, ILR 59 Mad 656 : (AIR 1936 Mad 387), a Division Bench of Beasley, C.J. and Stodart, J. held that an order of a single Judge of the High Court excusing the delay in the filing of a pauper appeal and admitting the appeal, is not a ' judgement' which can be the subject of an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In P. Baba Sah v. Purushottama Sah 47 Mad LJ 932 : (AIR 1925 Mad 167), Spencer, C.J. and Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. held that an order of a single Judge of the High Court granting permission to the plaintiff to sue in forma paperis amounts to a ' judgement' within the meaning of Clause 15, Letters Patent.

In Cork Industries v. Govindarajulu Mudaliar, 1964-2 Mad LJ 265 : (AIR 1965 Mad 87), Ramachandra Iyer, C.J. and Ramakrishnan, J. referred to this conflict, and, after a reference to Asrumathi Debi v. Rupendra Deb, 1953 SCR 1159 : (AIR 1953 SC 198) pointed out that there was a fundamental difference, for the purpose of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, between a case where leave to sue in forma pauperis is refused, and one where leave is granted; where leave is granted, the effect of the order is not to terminate the proceeding or suit, but, on the other hand, the suit is allowed to be proceeded with; such an order, therefore, does not amount to a ' judgement' and no appeal against it lies under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The actual issue involves a resolution of this conflict in the case law.

2. But, it also involves a far more extensive area of controversy in the case law. The question, what will amount to a ' judgement' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and by what touchstone, or by the application of which criteria, that has to be determined, appears to have been agitated in all the High Courts for several decades past; again upon what may be termed analogous situations, when a particular order of a single Judge of the High Court is or is not to be construed as a ' judgement' within the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the decisions are of a very wide variety, and exhibit several divergences of view. But the wider question of the tests to be applied to determine the status of an adjudication of a single Judge, with reference to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, has necessarily to be answered first, before the restricted issue can he disposed of. For this reason, I propose to undertake an analysis, confining myself to the landmarks in the case law, and imposing a necessary selectivity with respect to the precedents of analogous situations.

3. For an important reason, I think that the proper procedure is not to attempt a definition, or even a description, of ' judgement' as occurring in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, but to attempt to distil the essential tests for determining this, from the case-law. This is because a definition has been found to be almost impossible, and even a description to be beset with many pitfalls; on the contrary, the criteria at least have necessarily to be ascertained and precisely formulated. Once that has been done, we should be in a position to determine whether the order granting leave to sue in forma pauperis by a single Judge of the High Court is or is not an appealable judgement, within the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In my view, it is logically indefensible to argue from decisions impinging upon analogous situations, as has sometimes been attempted in the case-law. Firstly, such an argument, from the particular instance to a general proposition, is not the true mode of analysis. Secondly, the consequences of apply