The main legal point established in the judgment is that a compromise must be lawful, and the court must be satisfied of its lawfulness. The judgment also clarified the procedure for challenging a compromise and emphasized the importance of the court's satisfaction in recording the compromise.

1. The first respondent filed O.S.No.452 of 1986 for partition against his father Pacha Gounder who is now deceased and his mother and sisters who are the petitioners and the second respondent herein. The first defendant Pacha Gounder alone filed his written statement. In the written statement he denied the existence of the joint family. The third item suit property was stated to be his self-acquired property which he was entitled to deal with as he pleased. This written statement was filed on 2.1.1987 and adopted by the other defendants who are the petitioners and the second respondent herein. Pacha Gounder died pending suit and the plaintiff and the defendants being his legal representatives were recognized as such.

2. On 19.3.1991, the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise deleting item No.2 and declaring the right of the third petitioner and the first respondent to 6/15 share each in item No.1 and item No.3 and 1/15 share each to the petitioner Nos. l and 2, and the third respondent. In 2002, an application was filed for setting aside the preliminary decree passed on 19.3.1991 based on the alleged compromise of the same date. The petition was dismissed and therefore, this revision has been filed.

3. The learnedcounsel for the petitioner would submit that in 1986, the first defendant settled the property on the first petitioner herein and a panchayat deed was entered into on 18.10.1987 whereby the parties had agreed to share the properties as per Ex.B-l. Suppressing Ex.B-l, a compromise memo was filed into Court. So the decree passed in accordance with the same must be set aside since the parties to the compromise memo were not aware of the contents of the compromise memo, nothing was explained to them, and the petitioners being illiterate women put their thumb impressions on the memo without understanding the implications of the same. It was also submitted that when the counsel for the respondent, one Mr. G. Subramaniam reported no instructions to the Court on 15.3.1990, the compromise memo signed by the same Mr. G. Subramaniam cannot be acted upon. According to the learned counsel, the Court below completely ignored the fact that the compromise memo had been obtained by fraud and ought not to be relied upon.

4. Banwari Lal. v. Smt. Chando Devi, AIR 1993 SC 1139, was relied on wherein the Supreme Court held that while entertaining an application challenging a compromise memo the trial Court can consider the material in record and if it is shown that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 3, CPC, the order recording compromise can be recalled.

5. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand would submit that the first defendant himself had not spoken about the settlement deed when he filed the written statement. The parties have clearly understood the terms of the compromise and had signed the same. Even if three of the defendants had affixed their thumb impression, the third petitioner had signed in English and cannot plead ignorance. More importantly, their lawyer had also signed the compromise and as regards the signature of Mr. G. Subramaniam, counsel for the respondent it was submitted that if at all anyone can be aggrieved by the counsel without any authority signing the compromise it should be the Respondent and when the respondent has accepted that Mr. G. Subramaniam had signed as his counsel the petitioner can have no grievance.

6. Thelearned counsel for the respondent explained that on an earlier occasion the suit had been dismissed for default upon the counsel reporting “no instructions". Thereafter the respondent contacted the counsel and since the counsel reporting "no instructions" cannot file the vakalat again, the juniors in the office of Mr. G. Subramaniam filed vakalat on behalf of the respondent and when the compromise memo was signed the respondent requested Mr. G. Subramaniam, counsel to sign since it was only the s aid lawyer in whom he had co