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1963 Supreme(Mad) 336

MADRAS HIGH COURT
S. RAMACHANDRA IYER,ANANTANARAYANAN,SRINIVASAN,RAMAKRISHNAN,KAILASAM
Southern Roadways (P.) Ltd.
Versus
P. Mathew Rai Veeraswami (died) M. Dhanapalan
S.C. Petn. No. 203 of 1961 (against) W.A. No. 95 of 1958) and S.C.M.P. No. 244 of 265 of 1962
Decided On : 4 October, 1963

Advocates Appeared:
Advocate General for N.R. Govindachari, for Petitioner; G. Ramaswami and K. Thirumalai and Addl. Govt. Pleader, for Respondents.

Jurisdiction of High Court to issue directions in appropriate cases.

Headnote:Constitution of India-Articles 133, 226 - Order for granting or refusing of writ filed u/s 226 if an final order or judgment appealable to Supreme Court.

       

Judgement

S. RAMACHANDRA IYER, C.J. :- S. C. P. No. 203 of 1961 : This reference has become necessary on account of certain doubts felt in regard to the correctness of the decision of a Bench of three Judges of this Court Rajamannar, C.J., Ramachandra Iyer (one of us) and Ganapatia Pillai, JJ. in S.C.P. No. 117 of 1959 (1960?) (Mad). It was held in that case that an order under Art. 226 of the Constitution granting a writ of certiorari, the consequence of which was to revive and make available for fresh adjudication, the proceedings before the inferior Tribunal, was in the nature of a remand order which would not constitute a judgment or final order coming within Art. 133 of the Constitution. In a still earlier case, namely, Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1958 Mad 151 it was even held that an order rejecting a petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari would not amount to a judgment or final order, if the result of the judgment of the High Court in the writ proceedings did not have the effect of finally disposing of the rights of parties pending adjudication before the inferior tribunal. The correctness of these decisions, which, in essence, viewed the dispute between the parties before such a Tribunal as integrally connected with the proceedings under Art. 226 initiated in respect thereof, has now been challenged.

2. The question for consideration could, therefore, be formulated thus :

"Whether an order passed, either granting or refusing to grant a writ applied for under Art. 226, which has the effect of either reviving or leaving the controversy before the inferior tribunal for adjudication, can be regarded as a Judgment or final order under Art. 133 of the Constitution ?" 3. Before proceeding to consider the question, we shall state the facts which have occasioned the reference. The matter relates to the grant of one of two stage carriage permits between Tuticorin and Koilpatti. The petitioner, Southern Roadways, failed to secure the permit before the Regional Transport authority; but on appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, it was able to secure tine of the two permits. The propriety of the grant in favour of the petitioner was challenged by the first respondent but without success before Balakrishna Aiyar, J. in W. P. 999 of 1957. The judgment was, however, set aside on an appeal by the first respondent in W.A. 95 of 1958. As a result of the appellate judgment, a writ of certiorari was issued quashing the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The effect of the writ and indeed this was stated in the appellate judgment itself was to restore the proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal for a proper adjudication. Southern Roadways feeling aggrieved by the appellate judgment, has applied for a certificate under Art. 133, which the intention of filing an appeal to the Supreme Court. That application is resisted by the successful party on the ground that as the judgment of this court is left open the question as to which of the parties should get the permit, for future determination by the Tribunal, there was no final order of this court in respect of which leave to appeal to the Supreme Court could be granted.

4. 0n the question of the appealability, the view taken by this court can be said to be in a way uniform. In S. C. P. No. 117 of 1960 (Mad) to which we made reference earlier, the matter in dispute related to a variation of the route of a stage carriage permit, which was sought by the holder of the permit. The order of the Tribunal in that regard was quashed under Art. 226 of the Constitution by a single Judge of this court; on appeal that judgment was affirmed. An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was filed later, was rejected inter alia for the reason that the judgment of this Court was

"in the nature of an order of remand though technically it might be an order quashing the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal."

5. This view was accepted and followed by two of











































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