The main legal point established is the inalienability of lands attached to a religious office and the application of the Indian Limitation Act in determining the validity of the suit.

Sadasiva Ayer, J.

1. Plaintiff is the appellant. He brought a suit for a declaration that the alienation made on the 11th June 1883 of the pLalnt properties by the plaintiffs father and grand-father in favour of the 1st defendant (the alienation having been by sale of the kudivaram interest in certain lands) was invalid in law. The lands were service inam granted by the Karvetnagaram Zamindar as emoluments for doing puja in a temple.

2. One of the questions raised in the case was whether the kudivaram and the melvaram both constituted the maniyam or only the melvaram. In Muthu Goundan v. Perumal Aiyan (1921) 40 M.L.J. 429: I.L.R. 44 M. 588 the Full Bench decided in January of this year that there is a presumption in the case of grants of even inam lands (whether granted by the former ruling power or by a Zamjndar) that the grarjt was of both varams, I think that that opinion is binding upon us and I would therefore differing from the Lower Courts hold on this point that the grant was of both varams.

3. Another question was raised that the plaintiff was not the legal holder of the office of pujari on the date of suit as his father was alive (and is even now alive). The Lower Appellate Court held that on the true construction of the plaintiffs fathers letter to the guardian of the Zemindar (that letter being Ex. Q.) and of the order of that guardian (Ex. A.) the father had not ceased to be the holder of the office, that the plaintiff was appointed by Ex. Q. merely to do the duties of the office as his fathers proxy and that therefore the plaintiffs suit was unsustainable. Having however heard the two documents read and commented upon and seeing also that the plaintiffs father as plaintiffs 2nd witness deposed that he resigned the Devas-tanam service owing to illness, I think that on the true construction of these two documents the conclusion should be that the plaintiffs father did resign the office, that his resignation was accepted by the Zemindars guardian and that the plaintiff was recognised as the holder of the office after sifch acceptance of the fathers resignation. (I do not however agree with the appellants learned vakil that it was the appointment by the guardian of the Zaroindar that entitled the plaintiff to claim the office and not his hereditary right to succeed thereto on his fathers ceasing to hold it). The next question is whether the suit is barred by limitation. Both the Lower Courts held that it was barred. The alienation, as I said before, was in 1883 made by the plaintiffs father and the plaintiffs grandfather together. As the plaintiffs grandfather was the person then solely entitled to the office, and the plaintiffs father had no right either to the office or to the appurtenant lands at that time, his joining in the alienation was of no legal effect and the sale must be taken as one make by the plaintiffs grandfather alone for all legal purposes.

4. The subsidiary question now arises whether that sale was wholly void as the sale of lands attached as emoluments to a religious office. In C.M.S.A. No. 21 of 1920 I held (differing from Abdur Rahim, J.) that lands attached as emoluments to a religious office are inalienable in the same manner as the office itself and that the sale of such lands is a void transaction.

5. I do not wish to repeat the reasons which I gave in that case. That case however is pending in this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 19 of 1920. Even assuming that the alienation was valid till the death and for the life-time of the plaintiffs grand-father which occurred in 1886, the plaintiffs father could have set aside the alienation within 12 years of his succeeding to the office in 1886. He resigned his office only in 1915, that is, 29 years after he so succeeded to it. His resignation was probably made in order to set up his son to bring this suit as he evidently thought or was advised that he would himself be barred or estopped if he brought the suit to recover the lands. Now the q