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High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D. MURUGESAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B. RAJENDRAN
M. Lakshmanan
Versus
ICICI Bank Employees Union, Rep.by its Secretary A.L.Kalayappan & Another
O.S.A.Nos.333 to 335 of 2010
Decided On : 14-12-2010
(B)Words and phrases-Moral turpitude-The term "moral turpitude" has various shades of meaning in the various sets of circumstances-"Moral turpitude" means "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in private and social duties which a man owes to fellow men and to the society in general."
"Moral turpitude" is a phrase which can hardly be accurately defined. It can have various shades of meaning in the various sets of circumstances. The concept of moral turpitude escapes from precise definition, but has been described as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in private and social duties which a man owes to fellow men and to the society in general." In criminal law, the expression "moral turpitude" is used to describe the conduct that is considered contrary to community standards of justice, honesty and good morals. The expression "moral turpitude" can also be described as the criminal behaviour that is inherently bad, which is known as "malum in se" in contrast to the behaviour that is bad merely because it is forbidden in law, known as "malum prohibitum." Para 9
(C)Trade Unions Act, 1926(16 of 1926)-Sec.21A- Trade union-Office bearer-Disqualification-Moral turpitude-The expression "moral turpitude" means anything done contrary to honesty, modesty and good morals- The expression "moral turpitude" should be understood in the light of prevailing norms that is expected from a person-The term "Moral turpitude" should be interpreted in a widest possible manner while considering the conduct of a person convicted and sentenced.
Considering the above, the expression "moral turpitude" means anything done contrary to honesty, modesty and good morals. As has been observed by the Apex Court in Sushil Kumar Singhal’s case, the said expression in fact means that the conviction of a person in a crime involving moral turpitude impeaches his credibility, as he has been found to have indulged in shameful, wicked and waste activities. The expression "moral turpitude" should be understood in the light of prevailing norms that is expected from a person. The term should be interpreted in a widest possible manner while considering the conduct of a person convicted and sentenced. Para 13
(D)Trade Unions Act, 1926(16 of 1926)-Sec.21A-Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881(26 of 1881)-Sec.138-Trade union-Office bearer-Disqualification-Moral turpitude-Criminal case-Cheque dishonour-Conviction- All types of offences for which a conviction is rendered would not per se amount to a conviction involving moral turpitude, since surrounding factors are also relevant for consideration-There may be cases where the conviction and sentence imposed on a person under Section 138 may not be considered to be an offence involving moral turpitude.
All types of offences for which a conviction is rendered would not per se amount to a conviction involving moral turpitude, since surrounding factors are also relevant for consideration. There may be cases where the conviction and sentence imposed on a person under Section 138 may not be considered to be an offence involving moral turpitude. Para 13
(E)Trade Unions Act, 1926(16 of 1926)-Sec.21A-Banking Regulation Act, 1949(10 of 1949)-Sec.10(1)(i)-Trade union-Office bearer-Disqualification-Moral turpitude-Criminal case- Conviction-Sentence-Suspension-Mere suspension of sentence imposed by the criminal Court would not make the judgment of conviction non est and it could be acted upon.
We are not inclined to accept the said submission. It must be noticed that pending appeal only, the sentence has been suspended and not the conviction. So long as the conviction remains, the judgment can be the basis for grant of injunction. Hence, the claim of the appellant that the judgment of a criminal court cannot be the basis for the grant of injunction has to be rejected. Para 15
(F)Trade Unions Act, 1926(16 of 1926)-Sec.21A-Trade union-Office bearer-Disqualification-Moral turpitude-Sale price-Refund-Criminal case-Cheque dishonour-Conduct of a person in failing to honour his commitment to sell a property and getting the cheques issued by him to repay the money received dishonoured for insufficiency of funds would amount to moral turpitude.
Knowing fully well of the above, not only he had failed in his assurance to buy the property for three persons, but also he formed a partnership firm while in service, and also had issued cheques knowing that those cheques would not be honoured. The above conduct would be a relevant factor while considering the conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. If both the above conduct and the subsequent conviction are taken together, one must understand that the conviction and sentence under Section 138 would necessarily amount to an offence involving moral turpitude. Para 16
D. MURUGESAN, J.
All the three original side appeals arise out of the common order made in O.A.Nos.1005 to 1007 of 2010 in C.S.No.807 of 2010 dated 1.10.2010. The Original Applications raise an interesting question as to whether the conviction and sentence imposed on an employee of the bank under Section 138 of the Negotaible Instruments Act could be considered to be the conviction and sentence for an offence involving moral turpitude, thereby disentitling him to continue to be a member of the employees union and to hold the post of General Secretary of the union?
2. The original side appeals arise under the following circumstances. According to the plaint averments made by the first respondent union, the appellant was elected as the General Secretary of the first respondent ICICI Bank Employees Union, Chennai in the general body for the period from 14.10.2007 to 31.12.2009. The appellant became a partner in the real estate business run by Mr.Gopinath Ramadass & Mr.Gopinath Ramesh and he borrowed a sum of Rs.10 lakhs from each of them and a further similar sum from one Mr.Raja during the year 2002 assuring them of getting an immovable property at Selaiyur. Out of the said amount, the appellant purchased the property at Selaiyur, but failed to convey the same to the above three individuals. He also did not repay the said amount of Rs.30 lakhs collected from them. On demand, he issued three cheques dated 24.10.2008 in favour of the above three individuals and when those cheques were presented for payment, they were dishonoured with an endorsement “no funds”.
3. As the cheques were dishonoured, the three individuals filed a complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Alandur under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which was taken on file in C.C.No.10 of 2009. By order dated 18.3.2010, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Alandur found that the appellant herein being an employee of the bank and knowing the provisions of law, particularly, the Negotiable Instruments Act, had issued the cheques without maintaining sufficient balance and thereby he committed the offence punishable under the said Act. The learned Judicial Magistrate also found that the appellant involved himself in financial and real estate business while continuing in service of the bank. With those findings, the learned Judicial Magistrate convicted the appellant under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for another six weeks. The learned Judicial Magistrate also directed the sentence imposed on the appellant in C.C.Nos.10, 11 & 12 of 2009 to run concurrently.
4. The Secretary of ICICI Bank Employees Union, therefore, filed the civil suit before this Court for a judgment and decree of permanent injunction restraining the appellant herein from functioning, claiming or acting as General Secretary of the union or interfering with the working or activities of the said union. A further relief for a judgment and decree was also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the bank from recognizing/permitting the appellant herein to represent the employees of the bank as General Secretary of the union or in any other manner. In respect of the above plea, the Secretary of the union, who is the first respondent herein, has also relied upon Section 21-A of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 relating to the disqualification of the office bearer of the trade union. The said provision contemplates that in the event any person has been convicted by a Court in India for any offence involving moral turpitude and sentenced to imprisonment, he shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of executive or other office bearers of a registered trade union unless a period of five years has elapsed since his release. By that provision, the appellant is disqualified. The union had further alleged
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