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2012 Supreme(Mad) 3678

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
D. MURUGESAN & K.K. SASIDHARAN, JJ
Zubida Begum & Others
Versus
Indian Bank Rep by its Manager Guidy Branch, Chennai & Others
W.P. Nos.15386, 8099, 8381, 12970, 13456 of 2012
Decided On: 28-08-2012

Advocate Appeared:
S. Sethuraman, K.M. Vijayan, Senior Counsel, E. Vijay Anand, S. Ramesh, P. Raghunathan, Jayesh Dolia, M/s. Aiyer and Dolia, S. Parthasarathy, Senior Counsel, M/s. N. S. Manoharan, N.V. Srinivasan, Advocates, M/s. N.V.S. Associates Advocate, OM. Prakash, M/s. Ramalingam, Associates Tribunal Advocate.

Ratios
a. Provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable for the proceedings before the Tribunal constituted under the SARFASI Act.
b. Tribunals constituted under the SARFASI Act do not have the power to condone the delay in filing any proceeding before it by invoking the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act.

Headnote:(A)Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002(54 of 2002)-Sec.18-Limitation Act, 1963(36 of 1963)-Sec.3, 5, 29(2)-Security interest-Appeal-Limitation-Delay-Condonation-Tribunal-Jurisdiction-When the petitioners’ property was brought for sale by the authorised officer under the SARFASI Act, petitioners challenged it before the Tribunal and when it was dismissed, petitioner preferred appeal with delay-When the Appellate Tribunal had dismissed the petition to condone the delay by stating that it had no such power, petitioner preferred writ petition-While the petitioner contended that the Tribunal under the SARFASI Act was a Civil Court and in the absence of specific exclusion, provisions of the Limitation Act was applicable, respondent resisted it-Held, for the purpose of applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, the Tribunal constituted under the SARFASI Act could not be termed as Civil Court and the provisions of the Limitation Act could not be applied to the proceedings before it-As the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal, order under challenge was confirmed as correct and the writ petition was dismissed.

       (B)Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002(54 of 2002)-Sec.18-Limitation Act, 1963(36 of 1963)-Sec.3, 5, 29(2)-Security interest-Appeal-Limitation-Delay-Condonation-Tribunal-Jurisdiction-Provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable for the proceedings before the Tribunal constituted under the SARFASI Act-Tribunals constituted under the SARFASI Act do not have the power to condone the delay in filing any proceeding before it by invoking the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act.

       Even while providing these forums to redress the grievances of borrowers, guarantors and others affected, the parliament wanted early resolution of the dispute as otherwise there would be no meaning in introducing a new law for speedier recovery, notwithstanding the existence of another enactment on the subject. Therefore, it could be safely concluded that the decision to limit the period of filing the appeal without a proviso for extending the provisions of the Limitation Act, was a conscious decision. It is not for the Courts to conduct an enquiry to decide as to whether time is too short to approach the Appellate Tribunal. Para 62

JUDGMENT

K.K. SASIDHARAN, J

Introductory:

1. The core issue raised in these batch of cases, is whether the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (herienafter referred to as "SARFAESI Act") has power to condone the delay in filing second appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.

Lead case:

2. Since the principal question is one and the same in all these writ petitions, W.P.No.13456 of 2012 is taken as the lead case to narrate the relevant facts.

W.P.No.13456 of 2012

3. The petitioners were the Directors of a Company by name Kohinoor Steel Private Limited. The petitioners were also the partners in a firm called "Varsha Metals". M/s. Kohinoor Steel Private Limited availed financial assistance from Union Bank of India, Bangalore. Since the unit failed to clear the loan outstanding, the Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued on 23 December 2008, followed by a possession notice issued on 28 February, 2009. The Bank thereafter issued a sale notice on 18 January 2010 proposing to sell the secured assets on 20 February 2010.

4. The sale notice dated 18 January 2010 was challenged by the petitioners before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "Tribunal"), Bangalore in S.A.No.131 of 2010. The appeal was dismissed on 13 May 2010.

5. The order dated 13 May 2010 was challenged by the petitioners before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "Appellate Tribunal"), Chennai belatedly. There was a delay of six days in preferring the appeal and this made the petitioners to file an application before the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay.

6. The Appellate Tribunal was of the view that it has no jurisdiction to condone the delay. According to the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has already made the position clear that SARFAESI Act does not contain a provision conferring power on the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 18 of the Act. The application was accordingly dismissed. The said order dated 3 May 2010 in I.A.No.1220 of 2010 is challenged in this writ petition.

7. The applications preferred by the petitioners in other writ petitions were also dismissed solely on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal has no power to condone the delay.

Rival Contentions:

8. Mr.K.M. Vijayan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.8099 of 2012 made elaborate submissions with respect to the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act to an appeal preferred before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The substantial contentions are as follows:

(i) The SARFAESI Act has not expressly excluded the provisions of the Limitation Act.

(ii) Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would attract in case two requirements are satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision viz.,

(a) There must be a provision for a period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application and

(b) The prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

If the above two requirements are satisfied, the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follow.

(iii) In case the two primary requirements are satisfied, Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed under the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

(iv) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions under Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

(v) SARFAESI Act
















































































































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