Order passed by the Appellate Authority cannot be set aside.

The respondent-tenant in H. R. C O. P. No. 50 of 1978 on the file of the Rent Controller (Additional District Munsif) of Tirupattur, has directed this revision petition questioning the correctness and legality of the judgment made in C. M. A. No. 3 of 1980 on the file of the appellate authority (Subordinate Judge, Tirupattur) dismissing the appeal.

2. The brief facts of the case which led to this revision can be stated thus: The landlord, the respondent herein, filed I. A. No. 100 of 1979 seeking the permission of the Rent Controller to amend the H. R. C. petition by correcting the door number of the petition-mentioned premises as 56 from the wrongly mentioned door no. 57. This prayer was opposed not by the tenant. The learned Rent Controller allowed the application and permitted the landlord to have the door number corrected as 56 as prayed for.

3. Aggrieved by that order, the tenant preferred C. M. A. No. 3 of 1980 before the appellate authority who dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal is not maintainable either in law or on facts and observing that the remedy open to the petitioner was to file a revision against the impugned order of the Rent Controller. Now, this revision is preferred against the above said judgment in the C. M. A.

4. Mr. Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, would vehemently contend that the judgment of the appellate authority is unsustainable since section 23 (1) (b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960) hereinafter referred to as the Act) enables any person aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Controller to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority having jurisdiction within the prescribed time. According to the learned counsel, the word ‘order’, used in the said sub- section is wide enough to include every order, whatever be its nature, passed in the Rent Control proceedings and consequently it would include even an order while disposing of interlocutory matters Therefore, the only question that arises for my consideration is whether the word ‘order’ used in section 23 (1) (b) would include all kinds of orders passed while disposing of an interlocutory application.

5. The word ‘order’ is not defined in the Act. Sections 10 , 14 , 15 , 16 and 17 of the Act give powers to the Rent Controller to pass order for eviction of tenants, for recovery of possession by the landlord for repairs or for reconstruction, for re-occupation of the building by the tenant: (i) after repairs; or (ii) if the building is not demolished by the landlord despite his obtaining an order under section 14 (1) (b) and for restraining the landlord from interfering with the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. Now, section 23 of the Act empowers the appellate authority to hear an appeal preferred by any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controller. Under section 25, the High Court is given the power of revision on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority to satisfy itself as to the regularity of the proceedings under the Act or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein.

6. As stated supra, the very object of section 23 is to give a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controller, which affects his right or liability. Can it be said that the word ‘order’ occurring in section 23 (1) (b) is, in the context of that section, wide enough to include interlocutory orders which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights and liabilities of the parties? In a pending proceeding the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production, inspection of documents, issue of commission for the examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date for hearing and the admissibility of a document, the relevancy of a question and to set right mistakes such as correction o