M. VENUGOPAL, J.

Introduction:

The Petitioner has preferred the instant Review Petitions as against the Common Order dated 09.02.2016 in W.P.No.27520 of 2014 and W.P.No.32716 of 2015 passed by this Court.

2. This Court, while passing the impugned Common Order dated 09.02.2016 in W.P.No.27520 of 2014 and W.P.No.32716 of 2015 [filed by the Review Petitioner/Petitioner], at paragraph 16 to 20, had observed the following:

“16. In the case on hand, the title deeds were deposited under Form No.D17D by the guarantor with an intent to create security in favour of the bank, as contemplated in Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 on 10thDecember, 2009. The said title deeds were accepted by the officers of the Bank in Form No.D17E, dated 10thDecember, 2009, whereunder it was clearly stated that the title deeds were mortgaged with an intent to create security in respect of the said properties comprising of all lands and buildings, structures, erections, fixture and fittings thereon.

17. The security interest is defined, as the right, title and interest of any kind whatsoever upon the property created in favour of any secured creditor and includes any mortgage, charge, hypothecation, assignment other than those specified in Section 31 of the SARFAESI Act. In the case on hand, proper mortgage and assignment was made. Thus, the security interest was created in accordance with the requirement of the definition of “security interest”. Section 31 of the SARFAESI Act deals with the non application of the provisions of the Act to certain cases, with which we are not concerned.

18. In State of Haryana and others Vs. Narvir Singh and another (2014) 1 SCC 105, the Supreme Court, while examining the question as to whether mortgage by deposit of title deeds is required to be done by an instrument at all, observed that “In our opinion, it may be effected in a specified town by the debtor delivering to his creditor documents of title to immovable property with the intent to create a security thereon. No instrument is required to be drawn for this purpose.”

19. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the stay of the confirmation of sale would not come to an end unless the same is specifically vacated by the Court is noted to be rejected. The stay order remains in operation during the pendency of the petition. Once the petition, whereunder interim stay was granted, is dismissed, no interim order survives. The dismissal may be on any ground, whether for want of prosecution or on merit.

20. A reference to the case of A.V. Sreenivasalu Naidu Vs. V.K. Nataraja Goundan and another, AIR 1955 Madras 461, cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is misplaced. The said matter dealt with the disposal of the case in execution applications filed under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The confirmation of sale cannot be held as illegal, as the confirmation was made after dismissal of the writ petition on 8thJanuary, 2015. Having held that the security interest was properly created, the subsequent measures taken by the secured creditor Bank by issuance of demand notice and thereafter possession notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, are in accordance with law and cannot be faulted with. We are informed that the dispute is pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The petitioner is at liberty to raise all grounds available under the provisions of law in the pending dispute, if so advised.”

and consequently, dismissed the Writ Petitions.

3. Petitioner's Submissions:

3.1. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that this Court had failed to consider the plea of the Petitioner in W.P.No.27520 of 2014 as to whether a property was not given as security to the Bank and further whether any security was created to the Bank by mere depositing the title deeds of the property in the absence of complying wit