The main legal point established is that even temporary employees can be considered 'workmen' under the Industrial Disputes Act, and termination without complying with Section 25(F) may entitle the employee to cash compensation.

JUDGMENT :

R. SUBRAMANIAN, J.

1. Challenge in this Appeal is to the dismissal of the Writ Petition filed by the appellant questioning the award in ID No. 146 of 2001 dated 16.05.2002 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Chennai.

2. The facts that led to the filing of the Writ Petition are as follows:

2.1. The appellant who was working as a full time casual labourer in the Central Telegraph Office at Pondicherry was terminated with effect from the afternoon of 05.04.1998. An order to the effect was issued on 04.04.1998 by the Sub Divisional Engineer, Central Telegraph Office, Pondicherry.

2.2. Contending that the termination amounted to retrenchment without complying with the provisions of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the appellant raised the industrial dispute under Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellant would claim that he was appointed as a full-time casual labourer on 15.12.1994 and he had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year. He had also attended the literacy test for regularisation conducted by the Department on 20.02.1996. The appellant sent in a representation seeking regularisation on 20.03.1997. However, when he went for work on 06.03.1998, he was served with a notice of termination.

2.3. Claiming that the said termination is illegal, the appellant sought to raise a dispute under Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Upon failure of conciliation, the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the Central Government on 26.07.1999.

2.4 Before the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant contended that he was entitled to regularisation, since he has served for 240 days in a calendar year for more than two years consecutively. He would also dispute the claim of the employer at his employment was purely on an adhoc basis and therefore, he is not entitled to claim regularisation. An undertaking given by the appellant at the time of joining, to the effect that he would not claim regularisation, was also pressed into service by the employer.

2.5 The Industrial Tribunal found that the claim of the appellant that he was appointed as a full time temporary employee is not acceptable. The Tribunal concluded that the removal would not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the said finding, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant would not be entitled to the benefits of Section 25(F) of the Act. Ultimately, the Tribunal rejected the claim of the appellant/workmen and passed an award concluding that he would not be entitled to any relief.

3. Aggrieved the appellant filed the Writ Petition in WP No. 35102 of 2002 seeking to quash the award of the Industrial Tribunal. Before the Writ Court the appellant mainly contended that the termination would amount to retrenchment without complying with the provisions of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, the Tribunal was not right in concluding that he is not entitled to any relief.

4. The Management reiterated its contention before the Industrial Tribunal, apart from contending that the appellant was appointed as a temporary employee in part-time daily wages basis, since his father who was in service and died and he was over aged to be accommodated on compassionate grounds also. Therefore, his termination would not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Writ Court agreed with the contentions of the Management mainly on the ground that there was a ban on the engagement of a casual labourer imposed in the Department from 22.06.1988. Therefore, the very employment having been irregular, he cannot claim the status of a workman and therefore, the provisions of Section 25(F) would not stand attract. The Writ Court also concluded that the appellant has not established that he had worked for 240 days consecutively during a calendar year prior to 01.10.