IMPORTANT POINT
The court established that the provisions of the POCSO Act regarding the definition of a child and the nature of aggravated penetrative sexual assault are critical in determining the guilt of the accused, and that sentencing must adhere to the law in effect at the time the offences were committed.

JUDGMENT :

(Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.S.RAMESH, J.)

The appellant is the sole accused in the case before the Mahalir Neethimandram (Fast Track Mahila Court), Thanjavur in Spl. S.C.No. 48/2017, who has been found guilty for having committed the offences under Section 5(l), 5(n), 5(k) and 5(j)(ii) all read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short 'POCSO Act') and Section 506(i) IPC and thereby convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life till his last breath without any concession or remission in his punishment through judgment dated 24.04.2018.

2. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant is the biological father of the victim girl and she was also mentally ill. When the victim girl was 17 years four months and ten days, the appellant had forcibly raped his daughter, owing to which, she became pregnant and gave birth to a child on 27.03.2017. The appellant had also been repeatedly having sexual intercourse with the victim girl thereafter, till two months before she delivered his child. The mother of the victim girl was unaware of the pregnancy of her daughter, untill she gave birth to the child. Since the appellant, being the biological father of the victim, had involved in aggravated penetrative sexual assault repeatedly and had also impregnated the victim, he was charged for the offences under Sections 5(l), 5(m), 5(l), 5(j)(ii) all read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act and 506(I) IPC.

3. Before the trial Court, the victim girl was examined as P.W.1 and her statement given under Section 164 Cr.P.C., was marked as Ex.P1. P.W.2 is the mother of the victim girl and her complaint to the police was marked as Ex.P.2. P.W.6 is the Government Doctor, who had treated P.W.1 immediately after the delivery of the child and the Accident Register was marked as Ex.P.6. The date of birth of P.W.1 evidencing that she was born on 20.12.1999 in the bonafide certificate (Ex.P.8) was marked through P.W. 7, who is the Headmistress of the school in which P.W.1 studied. P.W.8- Doctor had produced the potency certificate for the accused, which was marked as Ex.P.9. P.W.11 is the Head Constable, who had obtained the blood samples from the accused, P.W.1, as well as the new born baby, for the purpose of analysing the DNA test. P.W.13 is the scientific officer, who had conducted the DNA test, the report of which is marked as Ex.P12. The investigation was conducted by P.W.14, who had also filed a charge sheet.

4. The trial Court, on the strength of the oral and documentary evidence before it, had come to the conclusion that P.W.1 was a child as defined under the POCSO Act based on Ex.P.8 and the evidence of P.W.7. The oral testimony of P.W.1 was also considered along with the evidences of P.Ws.2 and 3. Strong reliance was placed on the DNA report given by P.W.13, which report had certified that the baby born to P.W.1 is the daughter of the appellant and the test on the sample DNA of the appellant was arrived at 99.598 and the final opinion that the appellant is the father of the baby was 99.9999999999999%. On this basis, he was convicted for the aforesaid offences and sentenced to undergo imprisonment as stated supra.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was some unexplained delay in lodging the complaint and producing the appellant for medical examination and that the evidence of P.W.2 - mother is unreliable since her statement that she was not aware that her daughter was pregnant till the date of her delivery, is unbelievable.

6. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that when P.W.1's age is confirmed through the evidence let in by the prosecution, which establishes that she was a child on the date of the incident and in view of the DNA test report, which certifies that the appellant was the father of the baby born to P.W.1, all the offences for which the appellant was charged, stands substantially proved and therefore, there is no