IMPORTANT POINT
The court established that the original document's custody is not a prerequisite for invoking Section 33A of the Indian Stamp Act for recovering deficit stamp duty.

ORDER :

Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the 2nd respondent culminating in issuing of order No. 4921/B1/2016-1, dated 21.06.2018 and the consequent certificate of recovery in No. 4921/B1/2016, dated 13.08.2018 under Section 33A of Stamp Act and to quash the same.

Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the 2nd respondent culminating in issuing of order No. 4921/B1/2017-2, dated 21.06.2018 and the consequent certificate of recovery in No. 4921/B1/2016, dated 13.08.2018 under Section 80A of Registration Act and to quash the same.

1. These two writ petitions are filed challenging the order passed by second respondent seeking the petitioner to pay Deficit Stamp Duty and registration charges payable under registered release deed executed by the petitioner's sisters in her favour, registered with 3rd respondent as document No. 1003 of 2016, dated 30.03.2016 and consequential certificate issued by second respondent for recovery of alleged Deficit Stamp Duty and registration charges.

2. According to the petitioner, the property situated in S.No. 77/1, in Mundiambakkam Village, originally belonged to her father viz., Shanmugam. He died on 07.02.1997 leaving behind the petitioner and two of her sisters viz., Lakshmi and Ramani and petitioner's brother Ganesan as his legal heirs. It is claimed by the petitioner that two of her sisters viz., Lakshmi and Ramani executed a release deed on 30.03.2016 registered as document No. 1003 of 2016 on the file of the 3rd respondent. At the time of registration, the necessary stamp duty was collected from the petitioner and the document was released. After release of the document, the second respondent based on directions issued by the first respondent passed an impugned order stating that the document shall be treated as a conveyance chargeable to stamp duty under Article 23 of Schedule (I) to Indian Stamp Act. The second respondent also issued a consequential certificate for collection of deficit stamp duty and registration charges treating the release deed executed by sisters as a deed of conveyance. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner is before this Court.

3. Mr. A.R. Ramanathan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that when the original registered document was already released to the petitioner and the same was not in custody of the respondents, the second respondent was not justified in passing the impugned order directing the petitioner to pay deficit stamp duty as well as deficit registration charges. It is the specific contention of the learned counsel that only when the original document is in the custody of the registering authority, he can invoke Section 33 (A) of Stamp Act and seek payment of deficit stamp duty and after release of the documents when the custody of the document is not available with him, he is not entitled to invoke Section 33(A) of Indian Stamp Act. In this regard, the learned counsel relied on the following judgments:

(i) Jupudi Kesava Rao Vs. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao and Others, AIR 1971 SC 1070

(ii) Rashtrothana Parishat Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 1992 Karnataka 388

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the 2nd respondent exercising the statutory power available under Section 33(A), without application of independent mind was carried away by the directions issued by the first respondent and therefore, the impugned order cannot be allowed to stand. The learned counsel further submitted that though against the impugned order, the petitioner has appeal remedy before the first respondent, filing an appeal before the first respondent is only a formality, in view of the fact, the impugned order itself was made only as per the directions of the first respondent. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the appeal r