IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
ANITA SUMANTH, G. ARUL MURUGAN, JJ.
The State of Tamil Nadu and Others – Appellants
Versus
T.K. Jagadeesan – Respondent
W.A. No. 912 of 2021, C.M.P. No. 5382 of 2021
Decided On : 27-08-2024
JUDGMENT :
ANITA SUMANTH, J.
1. The State is in appeal as against order dated 19.12.2019 of the learned single Judge. The writ Petitioner was employed as a Sub-Registrar on 21.04.2010. While so, he had been presented with lease deed dated 19.04.2010 for registration. Based on his understanding of the lease deed, the writ Petitioner had presented the same for registration computing the stamp duty for a period of 3 years. In the course of quarterly audit, the audit team was of the view that the lease deed was for a period of 9 years and hence there had been loss of revenue amounting to a sum of Rs.15,60,300/-. A special report was submitted by the District Registrar (Audit) to the Inspector General of Registration on 25.04.2011, in terms of which, proceedings had been initiated for deficiency in stamp duty.
2. Parallelly, charge memo had been issued under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules to the writ Petitioner. The charge memo alleges failure and negligence on the part of the Writ Petitioner to collect necessary stamp duty leading to loss of revenue and his negligence was construed as violation of Rule 20 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1973 (Rules).
3. The writ Petitioner had attained the age of superannuation as on 30.04.2014. However, on the basis of the pending proceedings, he had not been permitted to retire. The initial period of lease was for 3 years, renewable at the instance of the lessee for 2 terms of 3 years each. Hence, according to the writ Petitioner, the period of renewal, which required concurrence from the lessee, ought not to be taken into account to determine the period of lease and hence collection of stamp duty for the initial period of 3 years was appropriate. The explanation tendered by the petitioner found acceptance with the enquiry officer.
4. The disciplinary authority however was of the view that the emphasis on the word ‘renewal’ by the enquiry authority had been disproportionate, and out of context. He noted that there were other clauses in the agreement, such as the provision for a lock-in period which ought to have been taken note of by the writ Petitioner and the enquiry officer. According to him, a wholistic reading of the terms of the lease deed would lead to the conclusion that the lease period ‘shall’ be 9 years only. He hence concurred with the allegation of audit team, that there had been undervaluation and hence loss of revenue to the State, deviating from the view of the enquiry officer and holding that the charge had been proved.
5. Proceedings dated 04.11.2015 had come to be issued compulsorily retiring the writ Petitioner, as against which W.P. No. 8477 of 2017 had been filed. The petitioner had been successful in the writ Petition, persuading the Court to conclude that the retirement of the Writ Petitioner must be treated as retirement on superannuation with all attendant benefits. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court was of the view that the conclusion of the Writ Petitioner had been as a quasi- judicial authority and the difference in opinion was only of a legal issue that might amount to an error, but nothing more. The State and the Inspector General of Registration are in appeal before us assailing the order of the Writ Court on several grounds.
6. The appellants argue that the conclusions of the Writ Court are contrary to the ratio of a slew of judgments. They first refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56 followed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of D. Shanmugasundram vs. The Deputy Inspector General of Registration, Cuddalore and Ors. W.A. No. 60 of 2023 dated 11.04.2023.
7. These judgments, according to them, would lead to a conclusion that even if the error committed by the quasi-judicial authority was one in law, that would not, by itself, lead to the conclusion that no disciplinary proceedings would follow. In this regard, t
State of U.P. and Others vs. Lalji Tandon (Dead) through LRs. (2004) 1 SCC 1
Syed Jaleel Zane vs. P. Venkata Murlidhar and Ors. AIR 1981 AP 328
Union of India and Ors. vs. Duli Chand
Disciplinary action can be taken against quasi-judicial officers for negligence, even if the error is one of law, and lease agreements must be interpreted holistically.
The court established that independent lease deeds cannot be aggregated for stamp duty calculations, and the existence of an alternative statutory remedy precludes the invocation of writ jurisdiction....
The main legal point established in the judgment is the court's discretion to grant a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC based on clear admissions in the pleadings and reply notice, especially when....
Stamp duty – Royalty and dead-rent, both cannot be levied simultaneously on same lease.
Substitution of a lessee’s name post-death does not attract additional stamp duty if it does not establish a new lease.
The court held that disputes related to lease tenure interpretation require detailed examination in civil courts and are not suitable for resolution under writ jurisdiction.
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