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1993 Supreme(Ori) 14

High Court Of Orissa
S. C. MOHAPATRA
JANARDHAN MOHAPATRA - Appellant
Versus
SAROJ KUMAR CHOUDHURY - Respondent
CRI. MISC.  673  Of  1992
Decided On : 02/08/1993

Advocates Appeared:
ADITYA PATNAIK, D.K.MAHANTA, D.N.Mahapatra, P.PALIT, P.V.Balakrishna Rao, P.V.Ramdas

A complaint under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instrument Act is an 'application' within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and therefore, the delay in filing the complaint can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Headnote:

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT ACT - DISHONOUR OF CHEQUE - COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCES - LIMITATION - SECTION 142 - DELAY IN FILING COMPLAINT - CONDONATION - SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963 - APPLICABILITY.

Fact of the Case:

Accused issued a cheque in favor of the complainant on 24-8-1991, which was dishonored by the bank due to insufficient funds. The complainant made a demand for payment on 20-9-1991, but the accused failed to make the payment. A complaint was filed in February 1992, alleging an offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (the Act). The trial court took cognizance of the offense and issued process against the accused.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the complaint was filed beyond the one-month limitation period prescribed under Section 142(b) of the Act. However, the court also held that the delay in filing the complaint could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, since a complaint is an 'application' within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

Issues: 1. Whether the complaint was filed within the one-month limitation period prescribed under Section 142(b) of the Act? 2. Whether the delay in filing the complaint could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Section 142(b) of the Act as imposing an absolute bar on taking cognizance of a complaint filed beyond the one-month limitation period. 2. The court held that a complaint is an 'application' within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and therefore, the delay in filing the complaint could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Final Decision: The court allowed the application to the extent that the trial court was directed to consider whether there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the complaint and, if satisfied, to condone the delay and take cognizance of the offense.

S. C. MOHAPATRA, J.


( 1 ) ACCUSED is petitioner in this application invoking the power under Section 462 Criminal Procedure Code to quash cognizance taken against him.

( 2 ) ACCUSED issued a cheque in favour of the complainant on 24-8-1991 which complainant deposited for collection in his account. Bank to which it was sent for collection did not honour the cheque on the ground that there is no sufficient fund available in the account of the accused. This fact was intimated to complainant oh 28-8-1991. Complainant thereafter called upon the accused to pay the amount which was received by accused on 20/09/1991. No payment having been made by the accused, complaint was filed in February, 1991 alleging that accused has committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). Trial Court having taken cognizance of the offence and having directed issue of process against the accused, this application has been filed to quash the cognizance.

( 3 ) MR. P. Palit, learned counsel for the petitioner referring to Sections 138 and 142 of the Act, submitted that the period of limitation having been prescribed in the Act itself for filing of complaint in writing taking cognizance on a complaint filed beyond that period is barred.

( 4 ) SECTIONS 138 and 142 of the Act read as follows :-"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. , of funds in the account : Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the Bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both : provided that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier : (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation - For the purposes of this Section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. " 139 to 141 xxx xxx xxx xxx "142. Cognizance of offences Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) :- (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138; (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138. "

( 5 ) LANGUAGE of Section 142 of the Act has limited the scope of taking cognizance. Such power is restricted to - (I) a complaint in writing by the payee or holder in due course; (ii) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which cause of action arose unde














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