The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provisions of the N. I. Act should be interpreted liberally in favor of the complainant, allowing for the condonation of delay in filing the complaint petition using the general provisions of the Limitation Act.

( 1 ) THIS is a petition challenging the judgment passed by learned 1st Additional istrict and Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2003 confirming the judgment of learned S. D. J. M. (Sadar), Cuttack in I. C. C. No. 304 of 2001 (Trial No. 7167 of 2001) wherein the petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 3000/- in default to undergo S. I. for a period of three months and further to pay a sum of Rs. 15. 000/- to the opposite party-complainant for the loss of the cheque amount and other ancillary expenses as a measure of compensation provided under S. 357 (3) of the C. P. C.

( 2 ) A cheque bearing No. 578559 for Rs. 12. 880/- issued by the petitioner in favour of the opposite party was dishonoured by the bank on the ground that the petitioner instructed not to honour the cheque. After the cheque bounced, the opposite party sent a notice by registered post to the petitioner asking him to make payment within the statutory period of 15 days. When the petitioner failed to pay the cheque amount within the stipulated time, the opposite party lodged the complaint case. Basing on the complaint learned S. D. J. M. took cognizance of the offence under S. 138 of the Negotiable instruments Act (in short, the 'n. I. Act') and conducted the trial. The opposite party examined two witnesses including herself as p. W. 1. The petitioner examined himself only in support of his defence. After considering the evidence of the parties learned S. D. J. M. . held the petitioner guilty for the offence alleged and awarded the sentence rioted above. The petitioner carried the appeal noted above but the said appeal having been dismissed, he has filed the present revision.

( 3 ) MR. N. C. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the legality of the impugned order solely on the ground that the complaint was barred by limitation. According to him, S. 142 of the Act as it stood before the amendment never contemplated any provision empowering the Magistrate to condone the delay and take cognizance of complaint filed beyond the period of 30 days from the date of cause of action i. e. on completion of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the drawer of the cheque. He contended that when the L. A. Act which is a special statute clearly prohibits the Magistrate from taking cognizance of an offence filed beyond the statutory period of 30 days, the provision of the Limitation Act or Criminal Procedure Code will not come to the aid of the complainant or the court in condoning the delay. In support of his stand Mr. Mohanty cited the cases in collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 597 : (AIR 2004 SC 956); Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal singh, AIR 1964 SC 260; State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, 1981 SCC (Cri) 625; dharanidhara Patra v. State, 1994 (2) OLR 139; Sil import, USa v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore (1999) 4 SCC 567 : 1999 cri LJ 2276 : (AIR 1999 SC 1609) and sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil kumar (1998) 6 SCC 514.

( 4 ) MR. P. K. Patnaik, learned counsel for the opposite party contended per contra that even if no specific provision was there in the pre-amended N. I. Act regarding condonation of delay, the provision of S. 142 of the N. I. Act could be expanded in terms of the spirit and intent of the Act, which is basically for the purpose of punishing persons issuing fake or invalid cheques. He submits that in appropriate cases, delay in filing the complaint involving offence under S. 138 of the n. I. Act can be condoned by adopting the provision of the Limitation Act, so that a person with evil intent shall not get away witlh the aid of technicalities of law. He indicated that releasing the omission in the Act the; law maker also brought amendment of s. 142 of the Act to enable the Court, in appropriate circumstances to condone the delky in presentation of t he complaint un-den S. 138 of the N. I. Act. In support of his stand Mr. Patnaik cited the following cases l (i)