The State is vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees committed in the course of their employment, including accidents involving government vehicles.

N. K. DAS, J.

( 1 ) BOTH the appeals relate to two cases for compensation arising out of the same accident, in which two clerks of the office of R. T. O. Sundargarh died. The accident is of a Govt. Jeep which took place on 9-1-1977 at about I A. M. The age of the deceased Lingaraj Behera in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 51 of 1979 was 26 years and he was having income of Rs. 270. 00 per month (as appears from the written statement) as a Lower Division Cferk. In Misc. Appeal No. 52 of 1979 the deceased was Bipin Bihari Pradhan aged about 25 years. The legal heirs of late Lingaraj Behera claimed Rs. 10,800. 00 and the claimants of deceased Bipin Bihari Pradhan laid a claim of Rs. 49,680. 00.

( 2 ) IN the morning of 9-1-1979 at about 7 A. M. the R. T. O. Sundargarh went to Purunapani via Biramitrapur for checking of vehicles. The Junior Motor Vehicle Inspector (O, P. W. 2) and one Sri G. C. Patnaik, the Enforcement Inspector also accompanied him. P. W. 3 was the official driver of the jeep. The two deceased persons, namely, Bipin Bihari Pradhan and Lingaraj Behera and two constables were in that jeep. After 11. 30 P. M. in the night, the occupants of the jeep had their dinner at Rajgangapur. Thereafter the jeep was driven by the Enforcement Inspector, G. C. Patnaik. While Sri Painaik was driving the jeep the accident took place at 2/3 K. Ms. before reaching Paramdihi. The jeep dashed against a tree. The Enforcement Inspector who was driving the jeep died at the spot and the two Lower Division Clerks, namely Lingaraj Behera and Bipin Bihari Pradhan also died at the spot. State of Orissa, the defendant, in the written statement has admitted the accident but has contended that the accident took place due to bursting of the rear tyre of the jeep and that the State is not liable as the accident took place while discharging sovereign functions. The Claims Tribunal has disallowed the claims in both the cases on two grounds: (1) The State is protected as the sovereign function was being discharged by its employees; and, (2) That the accident was due-to bursting of tyre.

( 3 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the R. T. O. (O. P. W. 1) and the Junior Motor Vehicle Inspector (O. P. W. 2) and Sri Patnaik, the Enforcement Inspector as well as two Lower Division Clerks had gone in the Government jeep. It is also not disputed that P. W. 3 was the official driver of the jeep. All of them had their meals at about 11. 30 P. M. at Rajgangapur. Thereafter admittedly the jeep was driven by Sri G. C. Patnaik, the Enforcement Inspector. While Sri Patnaik was driving the jeep and these two L. D. Clerks as well as O. P. W. 1, O. P. W. 2 and P. W. 3 were inside the jeep, the accident took place. It is also not disputed that the jeep dashed against a tree. It is contended by Mrs. Padhi, the learned counsel for appellants that the findings of the Tribunal that the officers were discharging sovereign function is wrong and that it was not a case of bursting of tyres. The learned standing counsel vehemently opposed the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants contending that on the principle of res ipsa loquitur it cannot be said that the State is, in any way, liable and that it was a clear case of sudden bursting of tyres resulting in the accident. Normally it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence, but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle res ipsa loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident "speaks for itself" or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for ttself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothin