1. Motor driver of Government vehicle caused fatal accident through rash and negligent driving — Suit for damages against driver and State for vicarious liability. (Para 2 )
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1962 Supreme(SC) 42
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2nd February, 1962
B.P. SINHA, C.J.I., J.L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH AND J.R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.
State of Rajasthan, Appellant
Versus
Mst. Vidhyawati and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 263 of 1958.
Advocates appeared
Mr. G. C. Kasliwal. Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan, (M/s. H. R. Khanna, S. 11. Kapur and P. D. Menon, Advocates with him)", for Appellant; M/s. S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, Advocates of M/s. Rajinder and Co., for Respondents.
The State is vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees committed in the course of employment, unless the act is an exercise of sovereign power. Liability is determined by tracing the legal position back to the predecessor trading company's liability as a non-sovereign entity.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 300 - Vicarious liability of the State for tortious acts of its employees - Extent of liability - Whether the State is liable for the negligence of a driver returning a government vehicle from a repair shop - The State is liable in like cases as the corresponding predecessor states might have been sued if the Constitution had not been enacted (Paras 5, 14).
(B) Sovereign Powers - Distinction between acts done in the exercise of sovereign powers and acts done in the conduct of undertakings that could be carried on by private individuals - Driving a vehicle back from a repair shop is dissociated from the exercise of sovereign powers and does not grant immunity to the State (Paras 3, 10, 11).
(C) Legal History of State Liability - Liability of the State traced from the Constitution through the Government of India Act, 1935, the Government of India Act, 1915, and the Act of 1858 to the predecessor trading company - The predecessor trading company, not being a sovereign, was liable for the negligence of its servants if an ordinary employer would be liable (Paras 6, 7, 8, 12).
Facts of the case:
A temporary employee of the State, working as a motor driver, while driving a government vehicle back from a repair shop, negligently knocked down a pedestrian, resulting in the pedestrian's death. The legal heirs of the deceased sued the driver and the State for damages. The Trial Court dismissed the claim against the State, but the High Court allowed it.
Findings of Court:
The High Court correctly held that the State is liable for the tortious act of its employee in these circumstances. The act of driving a vehicle from a repair shop is not an exercise of sovereign power.
Issues: Whether the State is vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees under Article 300 of the Constitution and whether the specific act of driving a vehicle from a repair shop constitutes an exercise of sovereign power.
Ratio Decidendi: The State is vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its servants committed within the scope of their employment, provided the act is not an exercise of sovereign power. Under Article 300, the liability of the State is equivalent to that of the predecessor trading company, which was liable for negligence that would render an ordinary employer liable. In a welfare state, the government's activities extend beyond maintaining law and order to include functions that private individuals can perform, thus removing the justification for absolute immunity.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. State's immunity from vicarious liability under Article 300 of the Constitution — Whether the vehicle was maintained in the exercise of sovereign powers. (Para 3 )
3. Distinction between sovereign functions and non-sovereign activities — State's liability as an employer in a welfare state analogous to the East India Company's liability. (Para 3 , 4 , 10 , 11 , 15 )
4. The State is vicariously liable for tortious acts of its employees committed in the course of employment, unless the act was an exercise of sovereign power. (Para 12 , 15 )
5. Appeal dismissed with costs. (Para 16 )
6. How is the distinction made between sovereign powers and non-sovereign activities for determining State liability in tort?
Sovereign powers include acts like military action or seizing prize property. Non-sovereign activities are undertakings that could be carried on by private individuals, such as maintaining vehicles or navigating steamers, for which the State can be held liable. (Para 10 , 11 )
7. How does Article 300 of the Constitution determine the liability of a State for the torts of its employees?
Article 300 provides that a State may be sued in relation to its affairs in like cases as the Dominion of India or corresponding Indian States might have been sued if the Constitution had not been enacted. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 )
8. What was the legal position regarding the liability of the East India Company for the torts of its servants?
The East India Company was not a sovereign and could not claim sovereign immunity; it was liable for the negligence of its servants if such negligence would render an ordinary employer liable. (Para 9 , 12 )
9. Does the nature of a modern welfare state affect the State's vicarious liability for the torts of its employees?
Yes; since the State engages in diverse industrial and public activities beyond maintaining law and order, there is no justification for immunity from the consequences of tortious acts committed by employees in the course of employment. (Para 10 , 15 )
Judgment
SINHA, C.J.I. : This appeal, on a certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, raises a question of considerable importance, namely, the extent of the vicarious liability of Government for the tortious acts of its employees, acting in the course of their employment as such. The Trial Court dismissed the claim for compensation as against the State of Rajasthan, which was the second defendant in the suit for damages for tortious act of the first defendant, Lokumal, who is not a party to this appeal. On appeal by the plaintiffs against the judgment & decree of the Trial Court, the High Court of Rajasthan passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs allowing compensation of Rs. 15,000/- against the State of Rajasthan also, which is the appellant in this Court.
2. The facts of this case may shortly be stated as follows. The first defendant. Lokumal, was a temporary employee of the appellant State, as a motor driver on probation. In February, 1952, be was employed as the driver of a Government jeep car, registered as No. RUM 49, under the Collector of Udaipur, The car had been sent to a workshop ion necessary repairs. After repairs had been carried out, the First defendant, while driving the car back along a public road, in the evening of February 11, 1952, knocked down one Jagdishlal who was walking on the footpath by the side of the public road in Udaipur city, causing him multiple injuries, including fractures of the skull & backbone, resulting in his death three days later, in the hospital where he had been removed for treatment. The plaintiffs, who are Jagdishlal s widow and a minor daughter, aged three years, though her mother as next friend, sued the said Lokumal and the State of Rajasthan for damages for the tort aforesaid. They claimed the compensation of Rs. 25,000/- from both the defendants. The first defendant remained ex parte. The suit was contested only by the second defendant on a number of issues. But in view of the fact that born the Courts below have agreed in finding that the first defendant was rash and negligent in driving the jeep car resulting in the accident and the ultimate death of Jagdishlal, it is no more necessary to advert to all the questions raised by way of answer to the suit, except the one on which the appeal has been pressed before us. The second defendant, who was the respondent in the High Court, and is the appellant before us, contested the suit chiefly on the ground that it was not liable for the tortious act of its employee. The Trial Court, after an elaborate discussion of the evidence, decreed the suit against the first defendant ex-parte, and dismissed it without costs against the second defendant. On appeal by, the plaintiffs, the High Court of Rajasthan (Wanchoo C. J. and D.S. Dave J.) allowed the appeal and decreed the suit against the second defendant also, with costs in both the Courts. The State of Rajasthan applied for and obtained the necessary certificate "that the case fulfils the requirements of Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India". The High Court rightly observed that an important point of law of general public importance, namely, the extent, of the liability of the State, in tort, was involved.
3. In support of the Appeal, counsel for the Appellant raised substantially two questions, namely, (a) that under Art. 300 of the Constitution, the State of Rajasthan was not liable, as the corresponding Indian State would not have been liable if the case had arisen before the Constitution came into force; & (2) that the jeep car, the rash & negligent driving of which led to the claim in the suit, was being maintained "in exercise of sovereign powers" and not as part of any commercial activity of the State. The second question may shortly be disposed of before we address ourselves to the first question, which is the more serious of the two raised before us. Can it be said that when the jeep car was being driven back from the
