The transfer of an execution proceeding under Section 24 of the CPC is not barred by a statutory provision specifying the executing court, provided that the transferee court has pecuniary jurisdiction.

R. N. MISRA, C. J.

( 1 ) THIS is a judgment-debtor's application under Section 115 of the Civil P. C. challenging the executability of the order of eviction passed by the Controller amounting to a decree in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Rourkela. The opposite parly filed House Rent Control Case No. 28 of 1968, obtained an order of eviction and levied execution thereof in the court of the Munsif, Panposh. The District Judge of Sundergarh transferred the said case in exercise of powers under Section 24 of the Civil P. C. to the court of the Subordinate Judge at Rourkela. When notice to show cause why the order of eviction may not be executed was issued, the judgment-debtor appeared before the Subordinate Judge and objected to his jurisdiction to proceed with the execution on the ground that it was contrary to the provisions of Section 15 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act. The objection has been overruled and the judgment-debtor has carried this revision application.

( 2 ) SECTION 15 of the Act provides:--

"the order of the Controller made under Section 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall be deemed to be a decree and shall be executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the house is situate. "

Relying on this provision, the judgment-debtor has contended that the order of eviction having been deemed to be a decree is only executable in the court of the Munsif and such a statutory execution is not available to be transferred to any court other than the named one. Therefore, in exercise of powers under Section 24 of the Civil P. C. , the District Judge had no jurisdiction to transfer the case to a court other than the court of the Munsif. At the time the stay application came up for consideration, the entire matter was heard. Mr. S. C. Mohapatra volunteered to support the application and petitioner's counsel assisted Mr. Mohapatra in support of the stand taken in the revision. According to Mr. Mohapatra, the direction for transfer of the execution case is contrary to law, inasmuch as the statute constitutes the Munsif with local jurisdiction to be the executing court.

( 3 ) IT is not disputed that the Munsif named in Section 15 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act is a Civil Court and to proceedings in his Court, the Civil P. C. has application. The Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra Aggarwal v. Stale of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1888, was considering the applicability of Section 24 of the Civil P. C. to a reference made under Section 146 of the Criminal P. C. It observed (at p. 1891) :-

"the next contention -- and it was the one pressed strenuously by him -- was that a proceeding upon a reference under Section 146 (1) entertained by a civil Court not being an original proceeding the provisions of Section 141, C. P. C. are not attracted and that, therefore, those provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which relate to suits are not applicable to a proceeding undertaken by a civil Court upon a reference to it under Section 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A number of cases dealing with this point were brought to our notice either by him or by Mr. Goyal. It seems to us, however, that those cases are not relevant for deciding the point which is before us. In passing, however, we may mention the fact that a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held in Maha Ram v. Harbans, ILR (1941) AH 193 : (AIR 1941 All 101) (FB) that the civil Court to which an issue on the question of proprietary rights has been submitted by a revenue Court under Section 271 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 has jurisdiction to refer the issue to arbitration under paragraph 1 of Schedule II of the C. P. C. This decision is based upon the view that by virtue of Section 141, C. P. C. the provisions relating to arbitration contained in the second schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, before the repeal of that schedule, applied to a proceeding of this