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2002 Supreme(Ori) 142

2002 (I) OLR (SC) — 697
S.P. BHARUCHA, CJI, SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, R.C.LAHOTI, N. SANTOSH HEGDE, DORAISWAMY RAJU, MRS. RUMA PAL, ARIJIT PASAYAT JJ.
P. Ramachandra Rao... Appellant
Versus
State of Karnataka... Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 535 of 2000
Decided on 16th April, 2002.

Headnote:1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 — Arts. 21, 14, 19, 32, 144, 141, 142, 226 and 227 — Right to speedy trial of criminal cases relating to fair and just procedure with reasonable expeditions — All previous decisions on this subject discussed at length — Overruling the findings in 1996 (4) SCC 32 (Common Cause), 1996 (6) SCC 775 (Common Cause) and (1998) (7) SCC 684 (Raj Deo Sharma) and relying on 1978 (1) SCC 248) (Menaka Gandhi) and 1980 (1) SCC 11 (Hussainara) and discussing elaborately the observations the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the following principles to be followed :

       (1)The dictum in A.R. Antulay's case is correct and still holds the field.

       (2)The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A.R.Antulay's case, adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and re-affirm the said propositions.

       (3)The guidelines laid down in A. R. Antulay's case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made.

       (4)It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I) Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The Criminal Courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause Case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most, the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the Courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A. R. Antulay's case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the Court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused.

       (5)The Criminal Courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions.

       (6)This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Government of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary - quantitatively and qualitatively - by providing requisite funds, man-power and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Government shall act.

       2. PRECEDENTS — A bench of lesser strength is bound by the view expressed by a bench of larger strength and cannot take a view in departure or in conflict therefrom — Bars of Limitation enacted in Common Cause (I), Common Cause (II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) running counter to the extent of the dictum of Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay's case cannot be sustained (Para 28)

       3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 — Secs. 468, 309, 258, 482 — Constitution of India, 1950 — Art. 21 — Speedy Trial — Bars of Limitation — After discussing the facts and provisions of law incorporated in Cr. P.C., held, Bars of Limitation are uncalled for and impermissible, firstly because it tantamounts to impermissible legislation and secondly as bars of limitation run counter to the doctrine of precedents and their binding efficacy as laid down by Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay's case.(Paras 21-A to 23)

JUDGMENT

R.C. LAHOTI — No person shall be deprived of his life or his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law - declares Article 21 of the Constitution. Life and liberty, the words employed in shaping Article 21, by the founding fathers of the Constitution, are not to be read narrowly in the sense drearily dictated by dictionaries; they are organic terms to be construed meaningfully. Embarking upon the interpretation thereof, feeling the heart-throb of the Preamble, deriving strength from the Directive Principles of State Policy and alive to their constitutional obligation. The Courts have allowed Article 21 to stretch its arms as wide as it legitimately can. The mental agony, expense and strain which a person proceeded against in criminal law has to undergo and which, coupled with delay, may result in impairing the capability or ability of the accused to defend himself have persuaded the constitutional Courts of the country in holding the right to speedy trial a manifestation of fair, just and reasonable procedure enshrined in Article 21. Speedy trial again, would encompass within its sweep all its stages including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial-in short everything commencing with an accusation and expiring with the final verdict-the two being respectively the terminus a quo and terminus ad que of the journey which an accused must necessarily undertake once faced with an implication. The constitutional philosophy propounded as right to speedy trial has though grown in age by almost two and a half decades, the goal sought to be achieved is yet a far-off peak. Myriad fact-situations bearing testimony to denial of such fundamental right to the accused persons, on account of failure on the part of prosecuting agencies and executive to act, and their turning an almost blind eye at securing expeditious and speedy trial so as to satisfy the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution have persuaded this Court in devising solutions which go to the extent of almost enacting by judicial verdict bars of limitation beyond which the trial shall not proceed and the arm of law shall lose its hold. In its zeal to protect the right to speedy trial of an accused, can the Court devise and almost enact such bars of limitation though the Legislature and the Statutes have not chosen to do so is a question of far-reaching implications which has led to the Constitution of this Bench of seven-Judge strength.

2. In Criminal Appeal No. 535/2000 the appellant was working as an Electrical Superintendent in the Mangalore City Corporation. For the check period 1.5.1961 to 25.8.1987 he was found to have amassed assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. Charge-sheet accusing him of offences under Section 13 (l)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was filed on 15.3.1994. The accused appeared before the Special Court and was enlarged on bail on 6.6.1994. Charges were framed on 10.8.1994 and the case proceeded for trial on 8.11.1994. However, the trial did not commence. On 23.2.1999 the learned Special Judge who was seized of the trial directed the accused to be acquitted as the trial had not commenced till then and the period of two years had elapsed which obliged him to acquit the accused in terms of the directions of this Court in Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar (1998) 7 SCC 507 (hereinafter, Raj Deo Sharma-I). The State of Karnataka through the D.S.P. Lokayukta, Mangalore preferred an appeal before the High Court putting in issue the acquittal of the accused. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide the impugned order, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the acquittal and remanded the case to the trial Court, forming an opinion that a case charging an accused with corruption was an exception to the directions made in Raj Deo Sharma-I as clarified by this Court in Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 604. Strangely enoug


























































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