JUDGMENT

Y. K. SABHARWAL, J. — Leave granted.

2. The question that falls for determination in the in¬stant case is about the ambit of the inherent powers of the High Courts under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to quash criminal proceedings. The scope and ambit of power under Section 482 has been examined by this Court in a catena of earli¬er decisions but in the present case that is required to be considered in relation to matrimonial disputes. The matrimonial disputes of the kind in the present case have been on considerable increase in recent times resulting in filing of complaints by the wife under Sections 498-A and 406, IPC not only against the husband but his other family members also. When such matters are resolved either by the wife agreeing to rejoin the matrimonial home or mutual separation of husband and wife and also mutual settlement of other pending disputes as a result whereof both sides approach the High Court and jointly pray for quashing of the criminal proceedings or the first information report or complaint filed by the wife under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC, can the prayer be declined on the ground that since the offences are non-compoundable under Section 320 of the Code, therefore, it is not permissible for the Court to quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint.

3. The facts here are not in dispute. Appellant 4 is the husband, Respondent 2 is his wife. Their marriage had taken place on 21.7.1999. They are living separately since 15.7.2000. Appel¬lants 1 to 3 are father, mother and younger brother of Appellant 4. FIR No. 8 of 2002 was registered under Sections 498-A/323 and 406 IPC at Police Station Central Faridabad at the instance of the wife on 2.1.2002. She has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied imputations. According to that affidavit, her disputes with the appellants have been finally settled and she and Appel¬lant 4 have agreed for mutual divorce. The affidavit further states that on filing of the petition for mutual divorce, state¬ments on first motion were recorded on 18.7.2002 and 2.9.2002. Also that in second motion filed by the parties to the marriage, their statements were recorded by the Court of Additional Dis¬trict Judge, Delhi on 13.9.2002. Counsel for Respondent 2 sup¬porting the appeal also prays for quashing of the FIR. There is, however, serious opposition on behalf of the State.

4. The High Court has, by the impugned judgment, dismissed the petition filed by the appellants seeking quashing of the FIR for in view of the High Court the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC are non-compoundable and the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked to bypass the mandato¬ry provision of Section 320 of the Code. For its view, the High Court has referred to and relied upon the decisions of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal : 1992 Supp (1) 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra : (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10, and Surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa : (1999) 5 SCC 238 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 998 : AIR 1999 SC 2181.

5. After reproducing the seven categories of cases as given in para 102 of Bhajan Lal case (supra) the High Court has held that the parameters, principles and guidelines for quashing of complaints, first information report and criminal proceedings have been settled in terms thereof and has concluded therefrom that the instant case does not fall in any of the said catego¬ries. It is quite clear that the High Court has lost sight of the earlier part of para 102 which made it abundantly clear that the said categories of cases were being given by way of illustration. Neither were the categories of cases given exhaustive nor could it be so. Before giving those categories, it was said in Bhajan Lal case (supra) that :

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation