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2025 Supreme(Ori) 305

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CHITTARANJAN DASH, J.
Doaba Industrial & Trading Company Pvt. Ltd. and Another – Appellants
Versus
Republic of India, Central Bureau of Investigation, BBSR and Another – Respondents
CRLMP No. 1526 of 2024
Decided On : 08-12-2025

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant: A. Pattnaik
For the Respondent: S. Nayak

The constitutional right to a speedy trial does not automatically lead to quashing proceedings unless the delay is solely attributable to the prosecution, especially if the accused contributed to the delay.

Headnote:(A) The Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to a speedy trial - Quashing of FIR challenged by a company implicated in misappropriation allegations - Delay in prosecution of over three decades claimed to be oppressive and unfair - Petitioners contend right to fair trial violated, urging court intervention to quash proceedings - Opposite Party contends delay attributable to Petitioners, who challenged various orders, prolonging trial - Court determines that delay primarily resulted from Petitioners' actions, denying quashing, yet allowing Opposite Party to complete evidence within three months. (Paras 3 to 8)

Facts of the case:
Petitioners alleged to have misappropriated aluminium ingots while acting as Clearing Agent for a public sector undertaking. Allegations initiated by CBI after stock shortage detected. Original FIR registered in 1994 with proceedings facing numerous delays due to legal challenges by Petitioners.

Findings of Court:
Delay attributed largely to Petitioners' repeated legal challenges rather than prosecution's inactivity; the court emphasizes upholding the right to a speedy trial while balancing delays attributable to each party.

Issues: Whether the lengthy delay in trial warrants quashing of prosecution amidst assertions of fair trial rights violations.

Ratio Decidendi: The court clarifies that a speedy trial is a constitutional right but neither every delay mandates quashing proceedings nor does the accused's contribution to delay justify termination of trials.

Result: The application for quashing the FIR and consequential proceedings is dismissed, but the prosecution must conclude evidence within a set timeframe.

Table of Content
1. background and allegations in criminal case. (Para 1 , 2)
2. right to a speedy trial infringement arguments. (Para 3)
3. prosecution's response to delay claims. (Para 4)
4. analysis of trial delay responsibility. (Para 5 , 6)
5. court's directive for expedited proceedings. (Para 7 , 8)

JUDGMENT :

CHITTARANJAN DASH, J.

1. By means of this application, the Petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. RC 52(S)/94 registered by Opposite Party No.1-CBI, along with all consequential actions/proceedings arising therefrom, including Charge-Sheet No.4 dated 31.03.1995 and the ongoing criminal trial/proceedings against Petitioner No.1 in S.P.E. No.32 of 1994 pending before the court of the Special Judge, C.J.M. (CBI), Bhubaneswar.

2. The background facts, as briefly stated, are that Petitioner No.1, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, was implicated in connection with the aforesaid FIR and Charge-Sheet No.4 dated 31.03.1995 on the allegation that, while functioning as the Clearing and Forwarding Agent of M/s. National Aluminium Company (hereinafter “NALCO”), a public sector undertaking, it had been entrusted with handling export consignments at Paradip Port pursuant to a tender for the period from 20.06.1991 to 19.06.1993. Under the terms of the tender dated 20.06.1991, the obligations of Petitioner No.1 included, inter alia, unloading NALCO’s export material at Paradip Port, stacking the same in the open yard allotted to NALCO by Paradip Port Trust Authority, supervising stuffing of the material into containers by the Port authorities, taking necessary precautions for the safety of the material prior to stuffing, lodging police reports and filing claims in the event of theft, liaising with concerned authorities, and maintaining accounts of material received, stuffed, and lying at the port. NALCO was entitled to recover any loss caused to the material due to negligence of Petitioner No.1. Separately, NALCO had engaged M/s. Marin Surveyors & Consultancy Ltd. (“MARCONS”) to supervise export activities at Paradip Port, including stock-taking of incoming and outgoing material and forwarding daily stock statements to NALCO. The aluminium ingots received from NALCO’s Angul factory were stored in open yards/sheds under the custody of Paradip Port Trust Authority and guarded by CISF personnel.

It is alleged that the regular stock statements submitted by Petitioner No.1 and MARCONS did not indicate any shortage until 04.09.1993. However, in a joint physical verification conducted on 04.09.1993 by officers of NALCO in the presence of both firms, a shortage of 46.943 MT of standard ingots and 5.866 MT of SOW ingots was detected, valued at approximately Rs.32.7 lakhs, giving rise to the allegation that both firms had misappropriated entrusted property. Treating the above as constituting a cognizable offence under Sections 120-B/406 IPC, the FIR was registered by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, Bhubaneswar.

Upon an earlier enquiry, the Chartered Accountant M/s. Mohapatra & Mohapatra had also reported shortage of aluminium ingots valued around Rs.30 lakhs, pursuant to which Paradip P.S. Case No.175 of 1993 was registered under Section 379 IPC. A complete stock verification was thereafter conducted on 04.09.1993 in the presence of representatives of Petitioner No.1, MARCONS, and NALCO’s Internal Auditors. The physical stock was found to be 700.98 MT of standard ingots and 348.747 MT of SOW ingots. When compared with the book balance, shortages of 16.943 MT of standard ingots and 5.866 MT of SOW ingots were noted. Paradip P.S. Case No.175 of 1993 was ultimately closed as a “false case” under Section 379 IPC, with a finding that the matter disclosed criminal misappropriation rather than theft. Considering the entrustment of goods to Petitioner No.1 and MARCONS, both firms were held prima facie liable for criminal breach of trust, and a charge-sheet under Section 406 IPC was submitted, on which cognizance was taken on 31.07.1995.

Pe

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