A landlady is entitled to evict her tenant for her personal requirement, even if she intends to use a portion of the premises for purposes of her office, library or study.

J.V.Gupta, J.

1. This is tenants petition against whom eviction order has been passed by both the authorities below.

2. The landlady, Smt. Sarita Singla filed the ejectment application under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), dated 21.4.1984, seeking the ejectment of her tenant Sardari Lal from the demised premises which consist of one room on the ground floor in a residential building in which she is residing herself alongwith her family. The ejectment was sought inter alia, on the ground that the landlady bona fide required the premises in dispute for her own occupation and for the occupation of her husband who was a lawyer and required the same for his office. She further stated that earlier they were living with the landladys mother in the remaining portion of the building bearing Municipal Unit No. 1277, but since in society it is considered degrading to live as `Ghar Jawai, her husband wanted to live independently from his mother-in-law. Accordingly, she pressed her mother to partition her share in the building and in accordance with partition, one-fourth share of the building bearing Municipal Unit No. 1277, which includes the room in dispute, has been allotted to her by the Civil Court decree dated 14.3.1984, and secondly, the premises were rented out for doing tailoring business whereas now the tenant has started the business of selling cloth therein and thus there was change of user.

3. The tenant in his written statement controverted the said allegations and pleaded that the landlady had sufficient accommodation for her residence and personal use; that she had got the demised premises transferred in her name in order to make a ground for ejectment with mala fide intention; she is residing along with her mother; there was no change of user and the same business is being carried on which was there since the start of the tenancy in the year 1971.

4. The learned Rent Controller found that the evidence led by the landlady is sufficient to prove that there was change of user by the tenant in view of the report of the Local Commissioner as the shop was being used for drapers whereas the same was not rented for the said purpose vide rent note dated 13.11.1971, Exhibit P.W.4/1. Consequently, eviction order was passed on 8.18.1985 on this ground alone.

5. Dissatisfied with the same, both the parties filed separate appeals before the Appellate Authority. In appeal, the Appellate Authority affirmed the finding of the Rent Controller on the question of change of user and at the same time reversed the finding of the Rent Controller on the question of bona fide requirement by the landlady and came to the conclusion that she has been able to prove that she required the demised premises for her bona fide personal use and for the use of her husband. Consequently, eviction was maintained by order dated 21.10.1987.

6. At the time of motion hearing, it was contended that the building is a shop and consequently the same could not be got vacated for the office of the husband.

7. Learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner submitted that there was no question of change of user even if the shop was rented out for tailoring business. The business of selling cloth is the extension thereof and, therefore, the view taken by the authorities below in this behalf was wrong and illegal. In support of his contention, he referred to Rattan Lal v. Asha Rani, 1988(2) RCR 549 : 1988 HRR 625 and Mohan Lal v. Jai Bhagwan, 1988(1) RCR 444 : AIR 1988 SC 1034. He further submitted that the premises were let out as a shop and therefore, the same could not be got vacated for personal necessity of the landlady. According to the learned counsel, even if the demised premises was a part of the residential house, the same was being let out as a shop from the very beginning and was situate in a street and was separate from the residential portion. Thus, argued the learned counsel, no e