Back
PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
I.D.Dua, J.
P.S.Kaicker
Versus
Union Of India
Civil Revision Case No. 492 of 1959,
Decided On : AUGUST 25, 1960
AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS - ORDER VI RULE 17 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - DISCRETION OF THE COURT - SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE BY APPELLATE AND REVISIONAL COURTS - POWER OF THE COURT TO ALLOW AMENDMENT - PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION - AMENDMENT INTRODUCING NEW CASE OR ALTERING REAL MATTER IN CONTROVERSY - CONDITIONS FOR ALLOWANCE - INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, Union of India, filed two suits against the defendants, P. S. Kaicker and Din Dayal Kaicker, arising out of the same facts. The suits were based on an agreement dated 13th November, 1948, under which P. S. Kaicker was appointed as a special class apprentice for a period of six years. The plaintiff alleged that P. S. Kaicker had breached the agreement by not resuming duty after the expiry of his leave and by writing to the Government that he was forced to stay away from his duty. The defendants denied the breach of agreement and pleaded that the plaintiff had not fulfilled its part of the agreement by not sending P. S. Kaicker to the United Kingdom for further studies as per the terms of the agreement. During the trial, the plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint to clarify the position and to determine the real question in controversy between the parties. The trial court allowed the amendment, and the defendants filed revision petitions challenging the order.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the trial court had the power to allow the amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it was necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. The court further held that the amendment did not introduce a new case or alter the real matter in controversy, and that the defendants were not being taken by surprise. The court also held that the defendants had not shown any irreparable injustice caused to them by the amendment. Therefore, the court dismissed the revision petitions.
Issues: 1. Whether the trial court had the power to allow the amendment of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Whether the amendment introduced a new case or altered the real matter in controversy? 3. Whether the defendants were being taken by surprise by the amendment? 4. Whether the defendants had shown any irreparable injustice caused to them by the amendment?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the trial court had the power to allow the amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it was necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. The court relied on the following principles governing the exercise of discretion to allow or refuse amendments: - Amendments can be allowed at any stage of the proceedings. - All such amendments must be allowed if they are necessary for the purposes of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. - Where a litigant does not act mala fide or has not by his blunder done some injury to his opponent which is not capable of being compensated for by costs or otherwise, the amendment should, in the interest of justice, be allowed, provided it is necessary for the purpose of adjudicating upon the real controversy between the contestants. 2. The court held that the amendment did not introduce a new case or alter the real matter in controversy. The court observed that the real controversy between the parties was what were the terms of the agreement between the parties and who committed breach and what is the effect of such breach. The court found that the terms of the agreement were specifically pleaded in the plaint and that the defendant had pleaded a sweeping denial of all material allegations in the plaint, but had also pleaded in the alternative that the plaintiff had been guilty of breach of the terms of the alleged agreement. The court concluded that the real and essential controversy hinged round the terms of the agreement which truly calls for adjudication in the suit. 3. The court held that the defendants were not being taken by surprise by the amendment. The court observed that the defendants had pleaded a sweeping denial of all material allegations in the plaint, and that they had also pleaded in the alternative that the plaintiff had been guilty of breach of the terms of the alleged agreement. The court concluded that the defendants were aware of the real controversy between the parties and that they were not being taken by surprise by the amendment. 4. The court held that the defendants had not shown any irreparable injustice caused to them by the amendment. The court observed that the amendment was necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties, and that the defendants had not shown any injury to them which was not capable of being compensated for by costs or otherwise.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision petitions filed by the defendants.
I.D.Dua, J.
1. These are two connected revisions (Nos. 492-D and 493-D of 1959) filed by defendants against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Delhi, dated 26th October, 1959, allowing amendment of the plaints under Order VI rule 17 of the Code of Civil procedure in two connected suits arising out o£ the same facts brought by the Union of India against the defendants.
2. The facts out of which the dispute arose need not be stated in detail but only broad outline need be given because that would be sufficient to give an idea about the nature of the allegations contained in the original plaint and the effect of the amendment sought. According to the plaintiff, P. S. Kaicker s/o Din Dayal Kaic-ker was appointed a special class apprentice for a period of six years from 2nd September, 1946, on terms and conditions which were reduced to writing in an agreement signed and executed by and on behalf of the plaintiff, defendant P. S. Kaicker and his father Din Dayal Kaicker on 13th of November, 1948.
According to this agreement, on which the plaintiff specifically relied in the plaint, the plaintiff was to make payments to P. S. Kaicker including stipends, pay in the shape of dearness allowance, travelling allowance, school over-head charges and for certain other amenities, paragraph 1 of the plaint also states that p. S. Kaicker had to be given training by the plaintiff in India and in the United Kingdom according to the terms o£ the said agreement and on completion of the training he was bound, if the plaintiff so desired, to serve the Indian Govt. Railways in the Mechanical and Transport (power) Dept. for three years and so on.
In paragraph 2 of the plaint, it is stated that in March, 1951, P. S. Kaicker asked for being transferred to the East Punjab Railway against his original choice, but before the decision of the Government rejecting this request could be communicated to him, he took leave and after the expiry of the period of leave he did not resume duty. On or about 17th of May, 1951, so proceeds the plaint, P. S. Kaicker wrote to the Government that he was forced to stay away from his duty and that he was not reporting back for duty.
In spite of letter, dated 19th February, 1.952, sent to P. S. Kaicker by the Mechanical Engineer, Central Railway, advising him that his action in not reporting back for duty would amount to his having terminated his apprenticeship without the written consent of the Government, he (P. S. Kaicker) did not resume duty. This conduct, according to the plaint, amounted to termination of his apprenticeship by P. S. Kaicker without the written consent of the Government. Reference is next made in the plaint to clause 18 of the above mentioned agreement dated 13th November, 1948, tinder which P. S. Kaickers father. Din Dayal Kaicker, is bound in such circumstances to refund to the plaintiff the amount of stipends and pay amounting to Rs. 8,568/11/-.
3. This, in substance and essence is the nature of the suit filed against P. S. Kaicker. A similar suit relying on these facts was also filed against Pin Dayal Kaickejr and, as already observed, in these two suits applications for amendment were favourably disposed of by the impugned order.
4. This suit was resisted on various grounds including denial of the agreement dated 13th-oi November, 1948. It was further averred that the plaintiff had not fulfilled its part of the alleged agreement although it is also pleaded that according to the alleged agreement the defendant was to be sent to the United Kingdom for further studies for two years on completion of four years training in India and that he was not being sent to the United Kingdom after his completion of four years apprenticeship in this-country.
It was in this form that the defendant pleaded breach of agreement on the part of the plaintiff and justified his omission to resume duty. There was also a general denial or non-admission of the various dates and details of facts as given in the
AI
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
