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1959 Supreme(P&H) 62
PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
G.D.Khosla and Bishan Narain JJ.
Bhagwat Dayal
Versus
Union Of India
Letter Patent Appeal No. 41 of 1957,
Decided On : APRIL 8, 1959
Acquisition of land for construction of houses in an area where there is a shortage of dwelling accommodation and suitable land is available serves a public purpose, but the Court should examine the agency selected to ensure that it is capable of achieving the public purpose.
Headnote:
LAND ACQUISITION - Public purpose - Acquisition for Co-operative House Building Society - Whether public purpose - Factors to be considered - Agency selected for achieving public purpose - Relevance - Acquisition for Dera Ismail Khan Co-operative House Building Society - Whether for public purpose - Provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Whether applicable - Discrimination against petitioners - Mala fides - Award by Land Acquisition Collector without jurisdiction - Subsequent appointment with retrospective effect - Validity - Fundamental right to carry on business - Whether violated.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, owners of a garden known as Mubarak Bagh, challenged the validity of the Notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector under Section 11 of the Act. The land was acquired for the construction of houses by the Dera Ismail Khan Co-operative House Building Society, Limited. The petitioners contended that the acquisition was not for a public purpose, that the provisions of Part VII of the Act were not complied with, that the Government acted mala fide in acquiring the land, and that the award of the Land Acquisition Collector was without jurisdiction.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the acquisition of land for the construction of houses by the Co-operative Society was for a public purpose, considering the acute shortage of dwelling accommodation and building sites in Delhi. The Court also held that the provisions of Part VII of the Act were not applicable to the present acquisition as it was not for a purpose specified in Section 40 of the Act. The Court further held that there was no discrimination against the petitioners and that the Government did not act mala fide in acquiring the land. The Court also upheld the validity of the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector, despite his initial lack of jurisdiction, due to the subsequent appointment with retrospective effect.
Issues: 1. Whether the acquisition of land for the construction of houses by the Co-operative Society was for a public purpose. 2. Whether the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, were applicable to the present acquisition. 3. Whether there was discrimination against the petitioners. 4. Whether the Government acted mala fide in acquiring the land. 5. Whether the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector was without jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The concept of public purpose is not static but dynamic and changes from time to time in accordance with the requirements of the society. 2. Acquisition of land for a public purpose can be achieved through public agency or private enterprise. 3. The agency selected for achieving a public purpose is an integral part of the public purpose. 4. The Court should examine the agency selected to ensure that it is capable of achieving the public purpose. 5. Acquisition of land for construction of houses in an area where there is a shortage of dwelling accommodation and suitable land is available serves a public purpose. 6. A Co-operative House Building Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act is not necessarily a public purpose. 7. The Court should examine the circumstances of each case to determine whether acquisition for a Co-operative House Building Society serves a public purpose. 8. The provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, apply only to acquisitions for the purposes specified in Section 40 of the Act. 9. Acquisition for construction of houses in a locality where there is acute shortage of dwelling houses is not covered by the specific instances mentioned in Section 40 and, therefore, the procedure laid down in Part VII need not be followed. 10. Discrimination against the petitioners was not established as the Government was justified in acquiring the land for the benefit of the Co-operative Society consisting of displaced persons. 11. Mala fides on the part of the Government was not established as the petitioners did not pursue their application for developing the area seriously. 12. The award made by the Land Acquisition Collector was valid despite his initial lack of jurisdiction due to the subsequent appointment with retrospective effect.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, but the parties were left to bear their own costs.
Bishan Narain, J.
1. Bhagwat Dayal and four others were owners of a garden known as Mubarak Bagh which is situated in village Malakpur Chhowni Delhi. Its area is 215 Bighas and 5 Biswas. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi acquired this area by issuing a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereafter called the Act) on 14th October, 1955. Thereafter proceedings under the Act were taken and the Land Acquisition Collector on 23rd February, 1957 made his award under Section 11 of the Act. The erstwhile owners filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Notification issued under Section 6 of the Act! and also challenging the validity of the award. This petition was dismissed by Falshaw J. on 18th December, 1957 and the present appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent lias been filed against this decision.
2. The appellants case is this. They purchased the land now in dispute in 1944-45 for Rs. 2,75,000/- for the purposes of developing it. Since 1950 they have been trying to get the scheme for developing the area sanctioned. For this purpose they engaged the services of an architect who prepared a scheme for developing the area by converting the garden into building sites. On 20th August, 1953 the appellants submitted this scheme to the Delhi Improvement Trust for sanction. The Trust laid down certain conditions before sanctioning the scheme and the conditions were accepted by the appellants on 8th September, 1954. While this scheme was still under consideration of the Delhi Improvement Trust, a notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 23rd June, 1955 and notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 14th October, 1955. Shri Murari Singh then took proceedings as a Land Acquisition Collector and gave his award on 23rd February, 1957 while the notification appointing him Land Acquisition Collector was not issued till 30th March, 1957 though with retrospective effect. The Notification under Section 6 of the Act reads : --
"Whereas it appears to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi that land is required for public purpose namely for the construction of houses by the Dera Ismail Khan Co-operative House Building Society, Limited, it is hereby declared that the land described in the specification below is required for the above purpose."
3. I have reproduced above the Notification under Section 6 of the Act from the copy of the Notification filed with the writ petition. There is, however an obvious typing mistake in this copy inasmuch as the words "at the expense of the Dera Ismail Khan Co-operative House Building Society, Limited" do not occur therein. This mistake is clear from the fact that these words occur in the Notification under Section 4 of the Act and the petitioners in para 13 (b) have challenged the validity of this Notification on the ground that the compensation is to be paid from the funds of the society which is a private institution and not from, public funds. It may, therefore, be taken that there is a specific mention in the Notification under Section 6 of the Act that the compensation shall be payable from the funds of the Dera Ismail Khan Cooperative House Building Society, Limited and I shall deal with the points raised in this case on this basis.
4. I may first dispose of the respondents pleas which prevailed with the learned Single Judge as these pleas are in the nature of preliminary objections to the writ petition.
5. The respondents pleaded (1) that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in substance was directed against the notification dated 14th October, 1955 and therefore the writ petition filed on 20th May 1957 had been made after inordinate delay which has not been explained in the petition and (2) that the purpose of this writ petition was not to get the acquisition quashed but to get the compensation of the land enhanced.
6. The first objection relates to delay in challenging the validity of the Notification
