An order of attachment of immovable property under Section 146 (1) of the Code is interlocutory in nature within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code and consequently no revision against the same is maintainable.

S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.

1. Is the order of attachment of immovable property under Sec.146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, interlocutory in nature within the meaning of S.397 (2) of the said Code ? This is the significant question necessitating this reference to the Division Bench. Equally, at issue is a supposed discordance of single Bench views within this Court in Bhawan Pal V/s. Prem Kumar Jain, 1982 Chand LR (Cri) 121 and Shishu V/s. State of Haryana, 1982 Cri LJ 124.

2. The matrix of facts may be taken from Crl.Misc. No.2683-M of 1982 (Kartar Singh V/s. Pritam Kaur). Proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C, 1973 (herein after called the Code), were initiated by the Station House Officer of Sadar Police Station, Muktsar, in the Court of the Executive Magistrate Faridkot. After notice to the parties and giving a hearing to them, the learned Magistrate had attached the agricultural property in dispute and appointed the Tehsildar. Muktsar as the Receiver thereof till further orders from the Court. Against the said order, Kartar Singh and others preferred a revision in the Court of Session at Faridkot, seeking the setting aside of this order and the interim relief of its suspension till the final disposal of the revision petition. A preliminary objection was forthwith raised by the opposite party that no such revision was competent on the ground that the order of attachment under Section 146 (1) of the Code was inherently interlocutory in nature and the bar of Section 397 (2) of the Code was, therefore, firmly attracted. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, by his order dated May 6, 1982 upheld the preliminary objection relying primarily on the judgment in Shishus case (supra). Aggrieved by the said order, the present Criminal Misc. Application No. 2683-M of 1982 ( Kartar Singh V/s. Pritam Kaur) was preferred which came up for motion hearing before my learned brother Tewatia, J. sitting singly. Before him, reliance was sought to be placed on Bhawan Pals case (supra) for contending that the order of attachment was not an interlocutory one. Noticing some apparent conflict of precedent, the matter, as already noticed, has been referred for an authoritative decision.

3. Undoubtedly the primary and indeed the only question which has been posed at the outset herein indicates a sharp cleavage of judicial opinion betwixt the different High Courts within the country. It would appear that the High Courts of Punjab and Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Allahabad have tilted for one view whilst the High Courts of Bombay, Orissa and Rajasthan have chosen to opt for the other. In a matter so narrowly divided, one is inevitably faced with a somewhat difficult choice of subscribing to one or the other of the well matched rival opinions.

4. It is plain that the specific question herein is but a limb of the larger yet perennial controversy as to what constitutes a final as against a merely interlocutory order and the penumbral area lying betwixt the two extremes. In view of the mass of conflicting case law on the point, it would appear that these two terms are not capable of a precisely exclusive definition for each and it would be a vain attempt to define what seems to be inherently undefinable. One cannot help commenting that the erudite attempts to confine each of the terms to a procrustean bed of the precise legal definition is reminiscent of the somewhat tautologist definition of a circle as one, that is, circular. Therefore, without launching into a dissertation as to what are the precise legal attributes of a final order as against an interlocutory one and attempting to draw a razor-sharp line betwixt the two, I propose to confine myself to the limited focal question - whether in the peculiar context of Section 146 (1) of the Code, the attachment of immovable property is broadly interlocutory in nature and that too for the specific purposes of S.397 (2) thereof.

5. Mr. Arora, the learned counsel for