Prem Chand Jain, J.

1. The short question that requires determination in these cases may be stated thus :-

Does an appeal lie under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the decision of a learned Single Judge in appeal filed against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Claims Tribunal) given under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ?

2. The view of this Court as is evident from the Bench decision in Fazilka Dabwali Transport Co. (Private) Ltd. V/s. Madan Lal, (1968) 70 Pun LR 9 = (AIR 1968 Punj 277), is that such an appeal is not competent under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. At the time of the preliminary hearing, the correctness of the said Bench decision was challenged and on the strength of a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, (1969) 71 Pun LR (Delhi Section) 318 = (AIR 1970 Delhi 37) (FB), it was contended that an appeal by under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and that the Bench decision of this Court in Fazilka Dabwali Transport Companys case (1968) 7o Pun LR 9 = (AIR 1968 Punj 277) did not lay down correct law. Finding some merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, these appeals were admitted and were ordered to be heard by a Full Bench. It is in these circumstances that these appeals have come up for hearing before us.

3. The point which needs determination, was argued with ability by Mr. M. S. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant; it was contended by him that proceedings before the Claims Tribunal were not in the nature of arbitration proceedings and that this Court decides appeal under Section 110-D of the Act as a Court. It was also contended that the Claims Tribunal while disposing of the claims also acts as a Court. On the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant the first question that requires determination is the nature of the jurisdiction of the High Court dealing with an appeal under S. 110-D of the Act.

4. This question came up for consideration in Fazilka Dabwali Transport Companys case 7o Pun LR 9 = (AIR 1968 Punj 277) wherein, on this aspect of the matter, Shamsher Bahadur, J., who prepared the judgment, observed thus (on pages 13 & 14 of the report (70 Pun LR) = (at pp. 279 and 280 of AIR) :-

"Mr. Goswami rightly seeks support from the Supreme Court decision for his contention that the right of appeal is conferred by statute and is not a right which is given to the High Court under the general law. Neither the Tribunal nor consequently the High Court is strictly speaking a Court; indeed, the phraseology employed in Section 110-C itself is indicative of that intendment. The Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry has been given certain powers of a Civil Court for certain specified purpose. Obviously, the Tribunal cannot be regarded as a Court, strictly speaking, and the employment of the word "award" gives a complexion of arbitration to its proceedings. Naturally, it cannot be said that a right of appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is to be inferred; it must be so specifically granted. ** ** ** **

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The thread of reasoning in both these English decisions is that where a statute confers the right of hearing to an established Court, then the ordinary incidents of procedure with regard to appeal would be applicable. Can it be said in the present instance that the Claims Tribunal or the High Court heard the matters referred to them as established Court without more? I think the answer to this question would be in the negative considering the setting and background of Sections 110-B to 110-F of the Act. The Claims Tribunal has been invested with status different from a Civil Court and likewise the appeal to the High Court must take its colour and complexion from the original proceedings and subject to special conditions of the statute." From the discussion in the judgment it