The applicability of Article 181 or Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, to the execution of a decree for eviction, where permission from the Competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, is required, and the liberal interpretation of the expression "step-in-aid" in Article 182(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908.

1. The facts in this appeal are these. A decree for eviction was passed under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. At the time when it was passed it was not executable for two years from the commencement of the Delhi Tenants (Temporary Protection) Act, 1956 (Act 97 of 1956 ). It is common ground that it became executable on 11th March 1959. However, there was another hurdle in the way of eviction proceedings and that was the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (Act 96 of 1956) which came into force on 29th December 1956. On 29th May 1962 an application was made by the decree-holder to the Competent Authority under that Act which granted the requisite permission on 3rd May 1963 but directed that the decree would not be executed prior to July 1963. On 5th June 1963 an application for execution was filed and the objection taken was that it was barred by time. The executing Court held that it was not barred for two reasons. The first was that the time started running only after 31st July 1963 from which, date alone the decree could be executed according to the orders of the Competent Authority. The second reason was that the judgment-debtor had made an application for setting aside of the decree on 23rd April 1959. This application was dismissed on 21st October 1960 after reply had been filed by the decree-holder. The reply constituted a step-in-aid in execution and the decree-holder was entitled to deduct the time so spent. On appeal the learned Senior Sub-Judge affirmed the decision of the executing Court principally on the ground that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 , was applicable in view of a decision of Mehar Singh J. (as he then was) dated 27th November 1964 in Rani Kirpal V/s. Jain Sweitamna Temple Buildings etc. , Ex. S. A. No.226-D of 1963 (Punj) and time began to run only with effect from 31st July 1963 when the right to apply for execution accrued to the decree-holder. No decision was given on the second point which had prevailed with the executing court.

2. According to Mr. S. N. Chopra, for the appellant, it would be Article 182 of the Limitation Act which would govern the presets case and that the limitation would commence running from the date of the decree or order. It is pointed out that once time begins to run for the purpose of Article 182 no subsequent disability or inability would stop it and deduction could only be allowed from the prescribed period of limitation under some provision of the Limitation Act itself. There is no provision in that Act other than Sec.15 (1) and if the case does not fall under Sec.15 (1) the execution application must be held to be barred by time. Mr. Chopra has relied inter alia on my decision in which the above view was expressed in Pearey Lal V/s. Krishan Sarup, 1963-65 Pun LR 793: (AIR 1963 Punj 457 ). It is next urged that even if the decree was executable up to 11th March 1959 there was no justification for the decree-holder making an application to the Competent Authority under Act 96 of 1956 until after a lapse of a period of three years. There was no bar whatsoever in the way of the decree-holder in applying to the Competent Authority soon after the decree became executable in March 1959. In Yeshwant Deorao V/s. Walchand Ramchand, AIR 1951 SC 16 it has been laid down that Articles 181 and 182 of the Limitation Act and Sec.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure have to be read together. The Articles expressly refer to the section but they are independent or parallel provisions, different in their scope and object. Sec.48 (2) extends the 12 years period of closure by a further period of similar duration but the necessity of resort to Article 182 is not thereby obviated. The decree-holder must have been taking steps to keep the decree alive and the only circumstance that would relieve of this obligation is the existence of fraud under Sec.18 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Chopra therefore claims that when Article 182 was applicable the Courts below