The provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the principles of abatement do not apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and appeals filed under section 110-D of the Act.

1. This application has been filed by the appellants that Bela Singh, respondent No. 6, has died on April 9, 1971, and his legal representatives as detailed in para 4 should be brought on the record. This application was filed by them on March 17, 1972. The reason for delay which has been given is that appellant No. 2 has its office situated at Chandigarh and, as such, could not know in time about the death of Bela Singh. They further claim that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, 19 9, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) or to the appeals filed under section 110-D of the Act. The learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 has vehemently contested this application and has submitted that the appeal has abated in toto on account of death of Bela Singh.

2. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) has got no application to the proceedings under the Act or in appeals which are filed under section 110-D of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondents controverts this position and submits that in case of appeals in the High Court, there is no specific procedure which has been prescribed by any law. The High Court has to apply the procedure which it applies in the case of other appeals pending before it as a Court of civil jurisdiction.

3. It has been admitted by the learned counsel for both the parties that the rules have been framed under the Act for the proceedings to be taken under the Act before the Tribunal. There is no specific provision by which Order 22 of the Code has been made applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal under the Act. There is also no provision in the rules which makes the said order applicable in appeals before this Court. Mr. M.M. Punchhi, in support of his arguments, relied on a Full Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court reported as The Muncipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari and others, 1969 A.C.J. 276. In the said judgment, the Full Bench observed that an appeal against the award to the High Court is made in its ordinary civil jurisdiction. Similary, in a Full Bench decision of this Court in Shanti Devi and others v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Ambala and others, 1971 A.C.J. 247. it was observed that the High Court while hearing appeals under section 110-D of the Act, acts as a Court and a proceeding even if at its inception has a semblance of an arbitration proceedings, does not retain its character as such in appeal. From the aforesaid discussion, the learned counsel for the respondents wants me to infer that the provisions of the Code are applicable in the proceedings in appeal against the awards of the Tribunal under the Act. He submits that the proceedings are civil proceedings and this High Court decides such appeals in its civil jurisdiction and, therefore, the Code is applicable to such proceedings. The aforesaid observations had been made in a different context. The proposition which was before the Full Benches was as to whether an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent was maintainable against the decision of the Single Judge and whether that decision could be termed as judgment as contemplated in clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The observations of the Full Benches are with respect to the Letters Patent Appeals. Mr. Punchhi cannot take any benefit of those observations for the purposes of application of the Code. In my view, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents does not hold good. The Rules which have been framed under the Act provide the procedure which is to be followed by the Tribunals. In case the Legislature or the rule-making authority thought that the provisions of the Code or its Order 22 was to be made applicable in the proceedings before the Tribunals or before the High Court in appeals, they could very well do so. I am, therefore, of the view that the provisions of Order