The legislature can impose conditions or restrictions on the exercise of the right of appeal, including the requirement of a deposit of tax or penalty.

S.S.Sandhawalia, J.

1. The constitutional validity of Section 20(5) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act is the sole issue that has been debated in this set of nineteen connected writ petitions.

2. As is manifest from the above, the question being pristinely legal, any reference to the facts is hardly of any relevance and it deserves notice that the Learned Counsel for the petitioner did not even remotely do so. However, to appreciate the contentions raised and noticed hereafter, it becomes necessary to recall albeit briefly the legislative history of the aforesaid provision.

3. When originally enacted on 20th November, 1948, the relevant part of Section 20 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act read as follows:

20. Appeal.--(1) Within 60 days from the receipt of a notice issued under Sub-section (7) of Section 11 any dealer may in the prescribed manner appeal to such authority as may be prescribed against such assessment: Provided that no appeal shall be entertained by such authority unless he is satisfied that the amount of tax assessed on the dealer has been paid.

Later, by the East Punjab General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1953, the rigour of the rule requiring the payment of the tax assessed on the dealer before the appeal is to be entertained was softened by adding the following further proviso thereto:

Provided further that such authority if he is satisfied that a dealer is unable to pay the tax assessed may for reasons to be recorded in writing entertain an appeal without the tax having been paid.

The existing provision, which is under challenge, was placed on the statute book by the Punjab General Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967. The material part around which necessarily the present controversy revolves is in the following terms:

20. (5) No appeal shall be entertained by an appellate authority unless such appeal is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax or of the penalty, if any, imposed or of both as the case may be: Provided that if such authority is satisfied that the dealer is unable to pay the tax assessed or the penalty, if any, imposed or both, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, entertain an appeal without the tax or penalty or both having been paid or after part-payment of such tax or penalty or both.

4. Now, it deserves highlighting at the outset that from the very inception of the statute, the requirement of the deposit of tax has been a necessary adjunct to the entertainment of any appeal by the assessee and if at all the rigour of this rule has been mellowed down by the amendments which have followed since its original enactment. It had to be conceded even by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that the provision in its original and amended form has now held the field for a period of exactly three decades without ever having been successfully assailed on the ground of the vice of unconstitutionality.

5. It then deserves recalling that by virtue of Article 228A, Clause (3), enacted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, the present Civil Writ No. 8166 of 1976 and the connected petitions were placed before a Bench of five Judges of this Court, to which I was a party. In the context of the vacation of the stay granted earlier in the writ petition, the constitutionality of Section 20(5) was argued at considerable length before the said Bench and the following order was recorded on 21st March, 1978:

Heard. The Learned Counsel for the petitioners has failed to show how the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 20 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act is ultra vires the Constitution. The petitioners have, therefore, an alternative remedy by way of appeal which they have not chosen to avail of and in this view of the matter we see no reason to continue the stay which is hereby vacated.

It is evident from the very opening sentence of this order that the issue is virtually concluded against the petitioner. Nevertheless, Mr. Dogra has contended th