A mistake committed by counsel is not automatically a sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing an appeal. The mistake must be a bona fide mistake made in good faith and without negligence or inaction.

1. This civil Revision u/s. 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, is brought from the judgment of the Appellate Authority, Rupnagar, confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, Rupnagar. The petition of the landlord Ram Lok, seeking eviction of the tenant Gajjan Singh, was allowed.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are as below :-

Ram Lok filed a petition u/s. 13 of the Act against Gajjan Singh and the allegation, inter alia was that he required the premises for his own use and occupation. The petition was contested by Gajjan Singh on a variety of grounds. After considering the evidence, however, the learned Rent Controller arrived at a finding in favour of the landlord and the petition was granted on 25.07.77. Thereafter, Gajjan Singh applied for a copy of the judgment on 2.08.1977 and on the very same day, the copy was ready for delivery. On 5.08.1977 Gajjan Singh took the delivery of the said copy but the appeal was filed on 23.08.1977. Under S. 15 (b) of the Act the limitation prescribed for filing an appeal against the order of eviction is 15 days from the date of such order and in computing the period of 15 days, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against is to be excluded. A simple calculation in the present case would, therefore, indicate that the filing of the appeal was delayed by 12 days. Gajjan Singh filed an application u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, on the ground that his counsel Shri Santokh Singh gave him a wrong advice inasmuch as he considered that the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal was one month. It was asserted by Gajjan Singh that he was sick on 25-7-1977 and some time later came to Court and learnt about the decision. However, he applied for a certified copy of the order of eviction on 2.08.1977 which was ready for delivery on the very same day. It was asserted on his behalf that a wrong advice given by his counsel was a sufficient ground for condoning the delay.

3 The plea of Gajjan Singh, however, did not prevail over the learned Appellate Authority and finding that no sufficient cause was disclosed, the application u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected, Obviously, the result was that the appeal was held to be tune barred and hence it was dismissed. Being aggrieved against that order, the present revision is filed u/s. 15 of the Act.

4. Shri V. K. Vashishta, the learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously contended that an affidavit was filed by Santokh Singh, Advocate, and the learned Appellate Authority was in error in disregarding that affidavit. In that affidavit, presumably, it was disclosed that the said counsel considered that the period of limitation was one month. The learned counsel relied on Punjabi University V/s. Acharya Swami Genesh, AIR 1972 SC 1973 and State of West Bengal V/s. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, 1972 1 SCC 366. He further relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported as Smt. Shanti Devi V/s. Satyapal, AIR 1964 Punj 289. In all these cases, it was pointed out that a bona fide mistake was committed by the counsel and that he acted in good faith. In other words, neither negligence nor inaction could be attributed and on those grounds it was held that the mistake of the counsel being bona fide, the ground ascribed was sufficient for invoking the aid of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In the Punjabi University s case (supra), the mistake of the counsel was in the calculation of the period prescribed for limitation. The mistake was of only two days and on that basis, it was held that the mistake was bona fide. In State of West Bengal s case (supra) it was observed that there was neither negligence nor inaction on the part of the aggrieved party and the counsel gave a wrong adivce inasmuch as a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India was preferred in place of the other statutory reme