The limitation for a suit against a carrier for non-delivery of goods under Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act starts on the expiry of reasonable time within which the goods ought to have been delivered having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties.

Bishan Narain, J.

1. The following question has been referred to the Full Bench :-

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"Prom what time does the limitation start in a case in which the carrier delivers only part of the consigned goods and the claimant sues for compensation for remaining goods not delivered?"

2. The facts relevant for the decision of this question are these: The firm Amin Chand-Bhola Nath of Jullundur City booked two consignments of tins ingots from Ram Kristopur to Jullundur city on the 22nd November 1944 and the 7th July 1645 respectively. The first consignment was delivered at Jullundur city on the 16th December 1945 but it was found to be short by 11 cwts. The date of delivery of the second consignment is not clear from the record but at that time it was found to be short by 5 cwts.

There was certain amount of correspondence between the parties after this date and it was on the 28th April 1947 that the consignee filed the present suit for the price of the goods short delivered. The trial Court on the basis of the parties correspondence held that as the railway administration had not refused to deliver the goods up to the 8th January 1947 the suit filed on the 28th April 1947 was within time. Then on the merits the trial Court granted a decree for part of the claim made by the plaintiff-firm.

The railway appealed to this Court and challenged the correctness of the courts finding on the question of limitation. The appeal came up before Dulat J. and myself and finding serious divergence of opinion in this Court and in other Courts referred the question reproduced above for decision by a larger Bench.

3. It is conceded before us by both parties as was conceded before the Division Bench that in the circumstances of the present case Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act applies. It is also not disputed that there was no time fixed when the goods were to be delivered at Jullundur city. It is also nobodys case that there was any term, in the contract of carriage which expressly or impliedly had any relevancy to the time when the goods were to be delivered at the destination.

4. Now Article 31 reads:-

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"Description Period of Time from of the suit. limita- which period tion begins to run.

5. Against a carrier One year. When the goods for compensation ought to be for non-delivery delivered, of, or delay in delivering, goods.(5) Article 30 and this Article lay down the period of limitation for a suit against a carrier in certain circumstances. The corresponding Article to Article 31 in the 1871 Act related only to delay in delivering goods. Its scope was extended to cases of non-delivery by the 1877 Act. The period of limitation at that time was fixed at two years by the 1871 Act, but it was reduced to one year in 1399. The words of column (3) "when the goods ought to be delivered" have, however, remained intact and unchanged since 1871 and in this reference these are the words that have to be construed. These words have to be given strict grammatical meaning and equitable considerations are out of place in provisions of law limiting period of limitation for filing suits or legal proceedings. The principles which should be followed in construing provisions of limitation were laid down in Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chandra, AIR 1932 PC 165 (A) in these words:-

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"The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide".

Their Lordships of the Privy Council against adverted to this matter in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Janmshomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6 (B), and enunciated this principle in these words;

"It may be desirable to point out that a Limitation Act ought to receive such a construction as the language in its plain meaning imports. * * * * Very little reflection is necessary to show that great hards