33. The expression ‘employer’ has been defined in Section 2(g) of the ID Act to mean an industrial employer alone. Meaning of expression ‘association of employer’ or ‘federation of association of employers’ has been considered by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Andhra Pradesh Power Diploma Engineers’ Association’s case (supra). It has been observed that in the plain sense it would mean the status of the members of the association to be that of employer. The use of words is specific and without any ambiguity and accordingly have to be understood in their natural sense. The Full Bench observed that these words ‘are susceptible to the only meaning that the association must be of persons who are employers and have formed themselves into an association because of their status as such. In other words, 32 the membership of the association must be qua employers and not otherwise… …’. The Full Bench has opined that an association of persons enjoying different and varieties of status of which some accidentally happen to be employers would not be covered by the definition of expression ‘association of employers’. It is for the reason that when a statute speaks of an association of a specified kind of persons as forming a classification, it is the legislative intendment which is paramount and it is to be interpreted in that sense alone. Accordingly, it follows that these expressions as understood within the meaning of Section 36(2) to be an association of employers or federation of association of employers alone and not all others. For the aforesaid view, apart from placing reliance on the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh in Andhra Pradesh Power Diploma Engineers’ Association’s case (supra), reliance can also be placed on a Division Bench judgment of the Mysore High Court rendered in the case of Workmen of B.R. Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory v. B.R. Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory, (1969) 2 LLJ 25 Mysore. In that case from the Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of Federation of Chamber of Commerce it was found that the membership consist not only employer but all non-employer also such as practising lawyer. The Division Bench, therefore, took the view that the federation could not be regarded as an association of employers under Section 36(2) of the ID Act. Likewise, reliance may also be placed on another judgment of Gujarat High Court rendered in the case of Hosing Ardasar Ichhaporiya v. Mahavir General Hospital, Surat, (1994) 2 LLJ 326. The further requirement of Section 36(2) is that such an employer has to be represented by an officer of any association of employer or federation of association of employers with which it has been affiliated or of which it is a member.

34. From the aforesaid discussion it becomes evident that a legal practitioner can neither be an officer of the association of employer nor he can be member of any such association of employer because essentially the association of employer or federation of association of employers has to be only those of employers.

35. In the present case there is no material placed on the record to show the nature of relationship between Mr. B.P. Bansal and his associates, his employer or association of employer. However, Mr. B.P. Bansal, who represented the employer in the proceedings before the Labour Court was present in the Court on 11.9.2009. He has in unequivocal terms stated that he is enrolled as an advocate and a member of the Ludhiana District Bar Association, where he has a chamber. He has not shown us any document which may prove that he is covered by the expression ‘Officer’ of the association of employer or federation of association of employers to which his association of employer is affiliated. Therefore, in such a situation he cannot be regarded as an ‘Officer’ working with Hygienic Foods or an ‘Officer’ of an association of employers of which he is a member or an officer of a federation of association of employers to which suc

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