The main legal point established in the judgment is the consideration of the principles of bail, including the object of bail, the need for speedy trial, and the violation of Article 21 of the Constitution if the accused is denied bail and ultimately acquitted.

JUDGMENT

N.S. Shekhawat, J. (Oral) - The present petition has been filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of bail pending trial in FIR No.78 dated 25.04.2020 under Sections 302/34 IPC (later on Section 302 IPC deleted and converted into Sections 306/498-A-34 IPC) registered at Police Station Sadar Sangrur.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case. He further submits that the case was initially registered against the petitioner under Section 302 IPC, but later on, the said offence was converted into Sections 306/498-A/34 IPC. He next submits that from the allegations contained in the FIR, no offence under Sections 306/498-A IPC is made out against the petitioner.

3. He has also produced certified copies of the statements of PW-1 Harjinder Singh and PW-6 Komalpreet Kaur, which are taken on record as Mark 'A' and Mark 'B', respectively. He submits that even from the statement of complainant Harjinder Singh (PW-1), no offence under Section 306 IPC is made out against the petitioner. Apparently, he had not abetted the suicide of Rajni Kaur. He next submits that PW-6 Komalpreet Kaur had not fully supported the case of the prosecution and was declared as partially hostile and she had not levelled allegations against the petitioner, He further submits that the petitioner was arrested on 26.04.2020. He next submits that the charges have been framed in the present case. Out of total 22 witnesses, 08 have been examined and the conclusion of the trial may take long time and therefore, further custody of the petitioner would serve no meaningful purpose. He also relies upon an order dated 01.09.2021 passed by this Court in CRM-M-20321-2021, whereby co-accused namely Hari Singh has been granted the concession of regular bail.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has vehemently opposed the bail petition on the ground that there are serious and specific allegations against the petitioner. He further contends that the petitioner may influence the witnesses and he may not be released till the examination of the witnesses before the learned trial Court.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the rival contentions made by them The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI, 2011(4) RCR (Crl) 898 held as follows:-

'14) In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon.

The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un- convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, 'necessity' is the operative test.

In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of a refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any Court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether th