The central legal point established in the judgment is that offences under Section 306 IPC, involving allegations of provocation and abetment leading to suicide, cannot be quashed solely on the ground of compromise without any mitigating circumstances.

JUDGMENT

Avneesh Jhingan, J. (Oral) - Due to COVID-19 situation, the Court is convened through video conference.

2. This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is filed seeking quashing of FIR No. 161 dated 19.10.2020, under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC, registered at Police Station Dhakoli, District SAS Nagar, Mohali, on the basis of compromise.

3. The FIR was got registered by Seema Devi, mother of the deceased- Suraj Bhan. As per the contents of the FIR, marriage of deceased with Parule Mehta was solemnized in the year 2016. The couple was blessed with two children. In the year 2019, there were differences and the couple started living separately but from 1.10.2020 on the intervention of relatives they started to live together. On 18.10.2020 the complainant received a call from her daughter-in-law saying that something happened to the deceased. The complainant along with her daughters and son-in-law reached the house of the deceased. She was informed by daughter-in-law that deceased slept in a separate room, later it was found that he had hanged himself. His body was brought down with the help of neighbourers. As per the allegations, the daughter-in-law and her parents forced the deceased to commit suicide.

4. The only pleading in the petition is that FIR be quashed as parties have compromised the matter.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that as the complainant does not want to pursue the matter, hence the FIR be quashed on the basis of compromise.

6. Learned State counsel opposes the prayer and submits that offence is serious in nature, there was loss of human life and FIR cannot be quashed on the ground of compromise.

7. The Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, 2019 AIR (SC) 1296, considering the earlier decisions held as under:

''13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of t