Quashing of FIR under Section 306 IPC is permissible when allegations do not substantiate a prima facie case, particularly if parties reach a compromise aiming to restore peace.

JUDGMENT

Mr. Deepak Gupta, J.

Prayer in this petition is to quash FIR No.180 dated 14.04.2022 registered under Section 306 IPC at Police Station Mahesh Nagar, District Ambala on the basis of compromise dated 09.04.2023 (Annexure P.2).

2. Pursuant to the order dated 08.05.2023, parties appeared before the trial Court and got their statements recorded, affirming the compromise. Report dated 01.06.2023 of learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ambala has been received, as per which statement of the affected persons and the joint statement of the petitioners - accused have been recorded and that the compromise is with free will, as parties want to live in peace and harmony to avoid any future conflict.

3. However, learned State Counsel has opposed the prayer to quash the FIR on the basis of compromise by submitting that offence under Section 306 IPC is a heinous crime and quashing on the basis of compromise for such an offence cannot be allowed. He has relied upon Daxaben v. State of Gujarat and others , 2022(3) Crimes 224 , wherein accused was the wife of the deceased and her prosecution was sought for committing offence under Section 306 IPC. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that FIR under Section 306 IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else. Learned State Counsel has also referred to Nallari Sudha Rani v. The State of Telangana - Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.2967-2968 of 2019 decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 26.07.2021, wherein also, it was held that FIR registered under Section 306 IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. Further reference has been made to The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and others , (2019) 5 SCC 688 , wherein a three-judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that quashing petition should not be allowed on the basis of compromise for offences involving heinous and serious crimes.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners have referred to Sunita Rani and others v. State of Punjab and another, CRM-M-5794-2020 decided on 28.04.2023 by this Court, allowing the quashing of FIR under Section 306 IPC on the basis of compromise.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. This court dealt with the similar fact situation, as in the present case in Sunita Rani's Case (supra), and held as under:

6. The limits of the inherent power granted to the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C has been defined by Hon'ble Supreme Court from time to time in catena of authorities. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736, while discussing the scope of Section 202 and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the guidelines and the grounds on which proceedings could be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, by observing as follows: -

"(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

(4) where the complaint suffe