Failure to frame issues on adverse possession precluded the petitioners from leading evidence, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

JUDGMENT

SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. -

Factual background

1. Petitioners herein, namely, Baldev Singh, Teja Singh, Manjit Singh, and, Gurjit Singh instituted a petition against the Gram Panchayat concerned. The above petition became constituted under Section 11 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, (for short 'the Act'). The claim made therein was qua the petitioners being declared owners in possession of the land, comprised in khewat No. 63, khatauni No. 17//23 (8-0), 24(8-0), 25(8-0), 30//3(6-16), 4(7-18), 5/2(1-12), 7(0-7) total measuring 40 kanals, 13 marlas, situated at village Diyagarh, Tehsil and Distrtict Patiala. The above claim became rested upon the factum, that prior to 26.1.1950, and, upto the relevant stage, the petitioners with an animus possidendi, and, hence holding open hostile possession of the petition land. They also further asserted that the above open hostile possession of the petition land, was within the knowledge of the entire village. Consequently, they claimed that they have become owner of the petition land through adverse possession. The secondary contention, which was raised by the petitioners, in the petition was that, the said land was never reserved for any common purpose, and, that it was not amenable for being vested in the Gram Panchayat concerned.

2. The above contentions in the petition were resisted, and contested by the respondents. The respondents claimed, that in the jamabandis commencing from the year 1958, and ending upto the year 2008-09, the petition land has been described as shamlat deh. Therefore, it became vested in the panchayat deh.

Order of the Deputy Director, Village Development and Panchayat Patiala as comprised in Annexure P-2

3. The competent authority concerned, after assessing the revenue records relating to the petition land, as, commencing from the year 1958 and lasting upto the year 2008-2009, made a decision on 29.5.2012 hence declining relief to the petitioners. The reason which became assigned by the competent authority to dismiss the petition (supra), became grooved, in the factum, that though the petitioners had raised a contention that, their ancestors had made a purchase from persons, who were recorded in the revenue records, rather to be holding cultivating possession of the petition land, but since the above plea remained unproven, through placing on record any sale deed, as purportedly became executed nor his placing on record any consequent therewith order of mutation. Resultantly, the revenue officer concerned, came to a conclusion that the above plea remained unproven, hence leading him to dismiss the petition (supra).

4. Moreover, a further conclusion also became recorded in Annexure P-2, that since the petitioners remained completely unsuccessful in further proving, through adduction of cogent evidence qua his with an animus possidendi, rather holding cultivating possession of the petition land prior to the year 1950. Thus, an inference became drawn, that the plea of acquisition of title or perfection of title through adverse possession, as reared by the petitioners, also remaining unsuccessfully pleaded. Moreover, the competent authority concerned, through a common order dated 29.5.2012, dismissed all the petitions, instituted before him, under Section 11 of the Act.

Decision of the Appellate Authority on Appeal No. 253 of 2012

5. The aggrieved petitioners preferred an Appeal No. 253 of 2012, against the order, as comprised in Annexure P-2, before the Appellate Authority concerned. The Appellate Authority concerned, though referred to the petitioner's pleading, unfolding that prior to the year 1950, they have been in cultivating possession of the petition land, and, also referred to their further pleading, that they have acquired title to the suit land through adverse possession. However, the learned Appellate Authority concerned, did not record any findings in respect of the validity of the above latter plea. Moreover, the Appellate Authority conc